Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business
Volume 37 | Issue 3

Summer 2017

FinTech, RegTech, and the Reconceptualization of
Financial Regulation
Douglas W. Arner, Jànos Barberis & Ross P. Buckley

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb
Recommended Citation
Douglas W. Arner, Jànos Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, FinTech, RegTech, and the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation, 37 Nw. J.
Int'l L. & Bus. 371 (2017).
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb/vol37/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.

DOC2 (DO NOT DELETE)

Copyright 2017 by Douglas Arner, Janos Barberis, and Ross P. Buckley
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

9/18/17 1:12 PM

Printed in the U.S.A.
Vol. 37, No. 3

FinTech, RegTech, and the Reconceptualization of
Financial Regulation
Douglas W. Arner*, Jànos Barberis** & Ross P. Buckley***
Abstract: Regulatory change and technological developments following the 2008
Global Financial Crisis are changing the nature of financial markets, services, and
institutions. At the juncture of these phenomena lies regulatory technology or
“RegTech”—the use of technology, particularly information technology, in the context
of regulatory monitoring, reporting, and compliance.
Regulating rapidly transforming financial systems requires increasing the use of and
reliance on RegTech. Whilst the principal regulatory objectives (e.g., financial stability,
prudential safety and soundness, consumer protection and market integrity, and market
competition and development) remain, their means of application are increasingly
inadequate. RegTech developments are leading towards a paradigm shift necessitating
the reconceptualization of financial regulation.
RegTech to date has focused on the digitization of manual reporting and compliance
processes. This offers tremendous cost savings to the financial services industry and
regulators. However, the potential of RegTech is far greater – it has the potential to
enable a nearly real-time and proportionate regulatory regime that identifies and
addresses risk while facilitating more efficient regulatory compliance.
We argue that the transformative nature of technology will only be captured by a new
approach at the nexus of data, digital identity, and regulation. This paper seeks to
expose the inadequacy of digitizing analogue processes in a digital financial world, sets
the foundation for a practical understanding of RegTech, and proposes sequenced
reforms that could benefit regulators, industry, and entrepreneurs in the financial sector
and other industries.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I have a dream. It is futuristic, but realistic. It involves a Star Trek
chair and a bank of monitors. It would involve tracking the global flow
of funds in close to real time (from a Star Trek chair using a bank of
monitors), in much the same way as happens with global weather
systems and global internet traffic. Its centerpiece would be a global
map of financial flows, charting spill-overs and correlations.1
-Andy Haldane, Chief Economist, Bank of England (2014)
Regulatory and technological developments are changing the nature of
financial markets, services, and institutions in ways completely unexpected
prior to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), which we have addressed in
previous work.2 “FinTech” refers to the use of technology to deliver financial
solutions and is one aspect of these fundamental changes. The rapid evolution
and development of FinTech demands a similar evolution and development
of “RegTech.”3 RegTech is a contraction of the terms regulatory and
technology, and it comprises the use of technology, particularly information
technology (IT), in the context of regulatory monitoring, reporting, and
compliance. In the words of Christophe Chazot, HSBC Group Head of
Innovation, RegTech can be described as “technological solutions to
regulatory processes.”4 The automation of processes allows for better and
more efficient risk identification and regulatory compliance than that which
currently exists.5 The recent deal by which IBM is to acquire Promontory
Financial Group heralds the way forward. The synergies in the deal come
from the 600 risk and compliance consultants within Promontory teaching
Watson, IBM’s huge artificial intelligence system, how to apply AI to risk
management and compliance obligations.6
1 Andy Haldane, Chief Economist, Bank of Eng., Speech at the Maxwell Fry Annual Global Finance
Lecture: Managing Global Finance as a System, Birmingham University 10 (Oct. 29, 2014) (transcript
available online on the Bank of England website).
2 See Douglas W. Arner, Janos Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, The Evolution of FinTech: A New PostCrisis Paradigm?, 47 GEORGETOWN J. INT’L L. 1271, 1272-1319 (2016); ROSS P. BUCKLEY & DOUGLAS
W. ARNER, FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS: THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND REGULATORY FAILURE
(2011).
3 See infra Part C.III of this article; see also INST. OF INT’L FIN., REGTECH IN FINANCIAL SERVICES:
TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS FOR COMPLIANCE AND REPORTING 5-8 (March 2016).
4 INST. OF INT’L FIN., REGTECH: EXPLORING SOLUTIONS FOR REGULATORY CHALLENGES 2 (Oct.
2015).
5 See SANTIAGO FERNANDEZ DE LIS, ET AL., REGTECH, THE NEW MAGIC WORD IN FINTECH 1
(March 2016).
6 Penny Crossman, IBM Buying Promontory Clinches It: Regtech is Real, AMERICAN BANKER (Sept.
29, 2016, 4:42 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/ibm-buying-promontory-clinches-itregtech-is-real.
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Our vision builds on that of Andy Haldane, whereby financial
institutions and regulators monitor and analyze real-time financial
information from all parts of the global financial sector to underpin a safer
and more efficient financial system.7
Of late, two painful pressure points have come to bear on the financial
services industry and support our vision. On the expense side, postcrisis fines
have exceeded US$200 billion,8 and the ongoing cost of regulation and
compliance has become a primary concern industry-wide.9 On the revenue
side, competition from FinTech companies is expected to put US$4.7 trillion
of revenues at risk.10 These expense and revenue factors are driving the
development of RegTech. As with FinTech,11 the 2008 GFC represented a
turning point in the development of RegTech.12 However, the factors
underlying, and the beneficiaries of, RegTech are quite different. FinTech
growth has been led by start-ups (now increasingly partnering with, or being
acquired by, banks and other traditional financial institutions),13 whilst
RegTech developments to date are primarily a response to the huge costs of
complying with new institutional demands by regulators and policy makers.14
For the financial services industry, the cost of regulatory obligations has
dramatically increased, such that 87% of banking CEOs in one survey
7 See Haldane, supra note 1. The idea of using technologies to carry out real-time monitoring of
financial institutions and markets is also promoted by some academics and practitioners. See, e.g., Stefano
Battiston, et al., Complexity Theory and Financial Regulation, 351 SCIENCE 818, 819 (2016) (advocating
that “[o]ne ambitious option would be an online, financial-economic dashboard that integrates data,
methods, and indicators. This might monitor and stress-test the global socioeconomic and financial system
in something close to real time, in a way similar to what is done with other complex systems, such as
weather systems or social networks.”).
8 See Jeff Cox, Misbehaving banks have now paid $204B in fines, CNBC (Oct. 30, 2015, 1:58 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/30/misbehaving-banks-have-now-paid-204b-in-fines.html.
9 See Thomson Reuters Annual Cost of Compliance Survey Shows Regulatory Fatigue, Resource
Challenges and Personal Liability to Increase throughout 2015, THOMSON REUTERS (May 13, 2015),
http://thomsonreuters.com/en/press-releases/2015/05/cost-of-compliance-survey-shows-regulatoryfatigue-resource-challenges-personal-liability-to-increase.html.
10 See The Fintech Revolution, THE ECONOMIST (May 9, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/
leaders/21650546-wave-startups-changing-financefor-better-fintech-revolution.
11 Arner, Barberis & Buckley, supra note 2.
12 See INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, supra note 4, at 1 (observing that “[t]he financial
crisis of 2008-09 sparked an unprecedented regulatory response across the globe. . . . The new reforms
have dramatically increased challenges and costs for the financial sector related to compliance, reporting
and supervisory requests.”).
13 See Banks Rushing to Collaborate with FinTech Startups, FINEXTRA (Sep. 16, 2016),
https://www.finextra.com/newsarticle/29443/banks-rushing-to-collaborate-with-fintech-startups;
EY,
FINTECH: ARE BANKS RESPONDING APPROPRIATELY? (2015); Andrew Meola, 1 in 5 European Banks
Would Buy FinTech Startups, BUS. INSIDER (July 17, 2016, 11:01 AM), http://www.businessinsider
.com/1-in-5-european-banks-would-buy-fintech-startups-2016-6/?r=AU&IR=T.
14 See Gregory Roberts, FinTech Spawns RegTech to Automate Compliance, BLOOMBERG (June 28,
2016),
https://www.bloomberg.com/enterprise/blog/fintech-spawns-regtech-automate-complianceregulations/.
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considered these costs as a source of disruption.15 This provides a strong
economic incentive for more efficient reporting and compliance systems to
better control risks and reduce compliance costs. Furthermore, the massive
increases in the volume and types of data that have to be reported to
regulatory authorities16 represent a major opportunity for the automation of
compliance and monitoring processes. For the financial services industry, the
application of technology to regulation and compliance has the scope to
massively increase efficiency and achieve better outcomes.
For regulators, RegTech provides the means to move towards a
proportionate risk-based approach where access to and management of data
enables more granular and effective supervision of markets and market
participants.17 This provides the opportunity to minimize the risks of the
regulatory capture witnessed in the run-up to the 2008 GFC18 as well as being
a natural response to the increasingly digital nature of global finance.19
Furthermore, applying technology to regulation facilitates the monitoring of
financial market participants who are becoming increasingly fragmented by
the emergence of new FinTech start-ups.20
Enhanced reporting accuracy and decreased compliance costs are not
new incentives.21 However, as the financial services industry becomes
increasingly digitized, the gap between the accuracy and costs of manual and
automatic compliance and monitoring is widening. Combined with recent
advances in data science and analytics, RegTech’s growth can be understood
15

FERNANDEZ DE LIS, ET AL., supra note 5, at 1.
For a comprehensive summary of the various reporting requirements imposed by post-Crisis
regulatory reforms, see INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, supra note 3, at 5–8.
17 See IMRAN GULAMHUSEINWALA ET AL., INNOVATING WITH REGTECH - TURNING REGULATORY
COMPLIANCE INTO A COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 10 (2015) (observing that the development of RegTech
will eventually lead financial supervision to a “Compliance by Design” framework which enables
automated monitoring of compliance standard by the regulators.).
18 The argument is that if regulators are able directly to access financial data from supervised firms,
this will allow them to form their own evidence-based opinion on the state of the company as opposed to
rely on the company’s reporting. Similarly, as the amount of data available to regulators increases, their
policy decisions and the impact they have on financial markets may be simulated to more accurately
predict consequences as opposed to relying on market participants’ self-serving opinions.
19 See Douglas Arner & Janos Barberis, FinTech in China: From The Shadow?, 3 J. FIN.
PERSPECTIVES 23 (2015).
20 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR FINANCIAL INCLUSION, G20 HIGH-LEVEL PRINCIPLES FOR DIGITAL
FINANCIAL INCLUSION 12 (2016) (highlighting key action plans that “encourage the use of digital
technologies, as appropriate, to improve their processes and capacity for supervision.”).
21 For example, JP Morgan spent a combined US$600 million on regulatory and control technology
in 2015. INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, supra note 4, at 1. According to Thomson Reuters’s
Annual Cost of Compliance Survey, “[m]ore than two-thirds of firms (68 percent) are expecting an
increase in their compliance budget this year (2015) with 19 percent expecting significantly more. GSIFIs are expecting a noticeably greater increase in compliance team budgets with one third (33 percent)
expecting significantly higher budget.” Thomson Reuters Annual Cost of Compliance Survey Shows
Regulatory Fatigue, Resource Challenges and Personal Liability to Increase Throughout 2015, supra
note 9.
16
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as process automation to substantially decrease both compliance costs as well
as the potential for regulatory actions and fines.22
Regulation today is benefiting from the automation of reporting and
compliance processes. This trend is beginning to enable substantial cost
savings for industry and superior monitoring by regulators, such that the early
signs of real-time and proportionate regulatory regimes that identify risks and
enable more efficient regulatory compliance are beginning to emerge.23
However, the automation and streamlining of regulatory processes is only an
incremental evolution toward a better and more efficient regulatory
framework.
In this paper, we seek to analyze the rise of RegTech to aid the
understanding of regulators, industry, and the entrepreneurial community.
We argue that RegTech developments are at present incremental, but that we
are ultimately moving towards a paradigm shift that will necessitate a
reconceptualization of financial regulation.
We argue that the transformative potential of technology will only be
fully captured by a new and different regulatory framework situated at the
nexus of data and digital identity. The developments in FinTech, the
tremendous changes in emerging markets, and the recent pro-active stance of
regulators (for instance with the development of regulatory sandboxes) may
potentially combine to facilitate a transition from one regulatory model to
another.24 This paper sets out to provide a conceptual foundation for RegTech
and to craft a very rough roadmap that could serve to guide such a transition.
Following this introduction, Part II considers the evolution of RegTech,
so as to provide a framework of analysis for the remainder of the paper. Part
III considers the first element of this framework, namely the use of
technology by financial institutions and the financial industry to meet
regulatory requirements, particularly those resulting from reforms in the
wake of the 2008 GFC. Part IV discusses the technology used by regulators,
regulators’ historical relationship with the industry, technological
developments, and the challenges for regulators of the postcrisis
environment. Part V considers the new challenges of FinTech and the need
for RegTech in meeting them. Part VI concludes.

22 DELOITTE, REGTECH IS THE NEW FINTECH: HOW AGILE REGULATORY TECHNOLOGY IS HELPING
FIRMS BETTER UNDERSTAND AND MANAGE THEIR RISKS 4 (2015).
23 For example, in the area of payments transactions monitoring, the IIF observes that “[b]anks both
conduct post-facto checks on transactions (taking data inputs from loans, money market, payments and
interbank systems), and monitor, flag and block or report illegal transactions in real-time.” INSTITUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, supra note 3, at 9.
24 Currently there are at least four jurisdictions consulting on (and implementing) this new regulatory
approach of the regulatory sandbox. They are the UK, Australia, Singapore and Hong Kong. See, e.g.,
Australian Securities & Investments Commission, 16-129MR Innovation Hub: Regulatory Sandbox
Proposal, ASIC (May 4, 2016), http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/media-centre/find-a-media-release/2016releases/16-129mr-innovation-hub-regulatory-sandbox-proposal/.
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II. REGTECH: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
As noted at the outset, regulatory and technological developments over
the past decade have changed the nature of financial services and financial
institutions in ways quite unexpected prior to the 2008 GFC. We turn first to
the intentional aspect of this change: postcrisis regulation. Subsequently we
consider the digital transformation in developed countries and the growth in
digital financial services in developing countries; and then move on to
consider the rise and roles of FinTech startups and RegTech.
A. Postcrisis Regulation
The 2008 crisis and resulting postcrisis financial regulatory reforms
have transformed the way in which financial institutions operate, combining
to reduce their risk-taking, the spectrum of their operations, and their
profitability.25 The mass of new postcrisis regulation has dramatically
increased the compliance burden on financial institutions, in addition to the
direct cost of regulatory penalties (over $200 billion globally since the
crisis).26
These changes were the intent of the postcrisis regulatory reform
agenda.27 In previous work, we (and many others) have analyzed in great
detail the development, implementation, evolution, and effectiveness of
postcrisis regulatory reforms and their implications.28 This new regulatory
environment is one of the major drivers leading to the emergence of
RegTech; we return to this issue in Part III.
B. FinTech
With this dramatically altered regulatory, operating, and compliance
environment has also come the rapid evolution of technology and its
application to finance, namely FinTech. While FinTech as a term has only
risen to prominence in the past three years,29 the interaction between finance
and technology has a long history, one that we (and increasingly others) have
analyzed.30
25 For a brief overview of the postcrisis global mandated reforms and the profound changes in global
finance over the past 40 years, see Ross P. Buckley, Reconceptualizing the Regulation of Global Finance,
36 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 242 (2016).
26 See Cox, supra note 8.
27 See FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS OF THE G20 FINANCIAL
REGULATORY REFORMS: REPORT TO THE G20 (Aug. 2016).
28 See BUCKLEY & ARNER, supra note 2; RECONCEPTUALISING GLOBAL FINANCE AND ITS
REGULATION (Ross P. Buckley, Emilios Avgouleas & Douglas W. Arner eds., 2016).
29 See Fintech: Interest over Time, GOOGLE TRENDS, https://www.google.com/trends/
explore#q=fintech (accessed Sep. 19, 2016).
30 See Arner, Barberis & Buckley, supra note 2; Andrew Lo, Moore’s Law vs. Murphy’s Law in the

377

DOC2 (DO NOT DELETE)

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

9/18/17 1:12 PM

37:371 (2017)

Today’s FinTech landscape is the result of three major evolutionary
trends – impacting traditional financial services in global markets,
developing countries, and FinTech start-ups.31
1. Digital transformation in developed markets
In the developed world the transition from an analogue to a digital
financial industry started to occur in the late 1960s with the emergence of the
handheld financial calculator and the ATM.32 This was followed by decades
of increasingly rapid technological change leading up to the latest decade of
extraordinarily swift technological developments. While change has been
pervasive, particularly in wholesale institutional markets, two areas highlight
the scale of transformation: first, payments, and second, securities markets.
While electronic payment systems date back to the time immediately
following the invention of the telegraph, the most important developments
have occurred since the early 1970s, with electronic payment systems in
developed markets and cross-border payment systems such as SWIFT
(Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications)33 and
VISA,34 the establishment of RTGS (real time gross settlement systems) in
the 1980s and 1990s,35 and the creation of CLS (Continuous Linked
Settlement),36 culminating in today’s $5.1 trillion-a-day global foreign
exchange markets.37
This multidecade process took place through a carefully developed
partnership between major central banks and financial institutions, targeted

Financial System: Who’s Winning? (Bank for International Settlement, Working Paper No. 564, May
2016).
31 Arner, Barberis & Buckley, supra note 2.
32 Anuli Akanegbu & Ricky Ribelro, Calculating Firsts: A Visual History of Calculators, EDTECH
MAGAZINE (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.edtechmagazine.com/k12/article/2012/11/calculating-firstsvisual-history-calculators; Brian Milligan, The Man Who Invented the Cash Machine, BBC NEWS (June
25, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6230194.stm.
33 SWIFT was founded in the 1970s. SWIFT History, SWIFT, https://www.swift.com/aboutus/history.
34 VISA was launched in 1958. History of Visa: Our Journey, VISA, https://usa.visa.com/aboutvisa/our_business/history-of-visa.html.
35 See PETER ALLSOPP, BRUCE SUMMERS & JOHN VEALE, THE EVOLUTION OF REAL-TIME GROSS
SETTLEMENT: ACCESS, LIQUIDITY AND CREDIT, AND PRICING (Feb. 2009). For a more recent example in
developing countries like Zambia, see The Zambian Interbank Payment and Settlement System (ZIPSS),
BANK OF ZAMBIA, http://www.boz.zm/zipss.htm.
36 See JÜRG MÄGERLE & DAVID MAURER, THE CONTINUOUS LINKED SETTLEMENT FOREIGN
EXCHANGE
SETTLEMENT
SYSTEM
(CLS)
(2009),
http://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/
continuous_linked_settlement/source/continuous_linked_settlement.en.pdf.
37 See Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and OTC Derivatives Markets in 2016,
BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (last updated Sep. 1, 2016), http://www.bis.org/publ/
rpfx16.htm; Reuters, Forex Volumes in June Hit Above $5 Trillion a Day, FORTUNE (July 14, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/07/14/forex-volumes-june-brexit/.
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at both supporting economic and financial globalization, and reducing the
serious risks inherent in cross-border payments, particularly systemic risks.38
This is an important example of precrisis RegTech as well as in the evolution
of FinTech.39
In addition – and importantly from the standpoint of other major trends
– this global payments infrastructure also provided the basis for the rise of
alternative payment systems such as PayPal and AliPay.40
In the context of securities markets, since the early 1970s, markets have
transformed from 19th century paper-based physical systems to today’s
virtual electronic markets, characterized by high frequency and algorithmic
trading: the world of the “flash boys.”41 This trend began in 1971 with the
establishment of NASDAQ, the first fully electronic securities market,42 with
major consequences including the 1987 stock market crash (program
trading), the dot.com bubble and collapse in 2001, and the flash crash of
2010. Once again, this transformation arose from an interaction between
major market participants and regulators, focused on improving efficiency
and risk management while seeking to control risks to investors and
markets.43 This interaction can be seen in the context of the National Market
System (NMS) in the United States and the Investment Services Directive
(ISD), Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) and European
Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) in the EU. Today, of course, the
majority of securities trading involves computers trading with each other,
with humans as minority participants who almost never interact outside the
electronic environment.44
38 For example, they attempted to reduce risks like Herstatt risk (cross-currency settlement risk). The
Long, Dark Shadow of Herstatt, THE ECONOMIST (April 12, 2001), http://www.economist.com/
node/574236.
39 For example, the IIF highlights in its RegTech Report that “[n]ear real-time settlement could be
achieved through automation and global consensus on the blockchain. These capabilities could automate
compliance aspects in use cases including cross-border payments, syndicated loans, and repo markets.”
Institute of International Finance, supra note 3, at 15.
40 See Henry Helgeson, How China and Kenya are Winning the Payment Wars – and Why the US
Should Worry, FORBES (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2014/08/18/how-chinaand-kenya-are-winning-the-payment-wars-and-why-the-u-s-should-worry/#1503b8c56241.
41 See MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT (1st ed., 2015).
42 Nasdaq’s Story, NASDAQ, http://business.nasdaq.com/discover/nasdaq-story.
43 For a brief but comprehensive summary of the role of regulators and regulations in the
development of electronic markets and high frequency trading, see ANUJ AGARWAL, HIGH FREQUENCY
TRADING: EVOLUTION AND THE FUTURE, CAPGEMINI, at 19–20 (2012).
44 Trading is now dominated by high-frequency and computerized trading. Bradley Hope, 5 Things
to Know about High-Frequency Trading, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Apr. 2, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/
briefly/2014/04/02/5-things-to-know-about-high-frequency-trading/. The Financial Times also reports
that “[h]uman investment managers are at risk of being rendered obsolete by rapid advances in algorithmic
trading technology.” Miles Johnson, Human Investment Managers Risk Obsolescence, FIN. TIMES (Jan.
25,
2015),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/17129fc0-a48c-11e4-8959-00144feab7de.html#axzz
4KHL25EFp.
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2. Digital financial services in developing countries
Finance for economic development has long been an important focus
for policy makers seeking to support growth in developing countries.45 The
emergence of the mobile telephone in the 1980s and its rapid expansion in
developing countries from the 1990s set the stage for one of the most
important developmental transformations: the emergence of digital financial
services (DFS).
DFS are based on the idea of using mobile telephones or other digital
platforms to increase access to finance.46 This is a response to the
infrastructure gap that arises when mobile penetration is high, but physical
banking infrastructure (and thus financial inclusion) is very low, meaning
DFS are the most efficient delivery mechanism for financial products and
services. At the first level, the rapid adoption of mobile telephones across
large populations previously without access to communications technology
provided the necessary infrastructure. Once mobile phones became widely
used and available, network effects combined with unmet demand (in this
case for financial services) provided the opportunity to use the new, widely
available technology to provide access to financial services. The result has
been (particularly in parts of Africa) a real success story of increasing
financial inclusion and economic growth.47
Unlike the digitization of developed country wholesale and institutional
markets, in general DFS in most developing countries has developed
independently of the efforts of financial regulators, and it was usually led by
mobile telecommunications companies.48 In many cases, financial regulators
only began addressing potential risks to consumers and financial stability
once mobile payments had already become of major importance in the
domestic financial system.

45 See DOUGLAS ARNER, FINANCIAL STABILITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE ROLE OF LAW
(2007).
46 This idea is also known as “digital financial inclusion” which “refers broadly to the use of digital
financial services to advance financial inclusion. It involves the deployment of digital means to reach
financially excluded and underserved populations with a range of formal financial services suited to their
needs, delivered responsibly at a cost affordable to customers and sustainable for providers.” GLOBAL
PARTNERSHIP FOR FINANCIAL INCLUSION, GLOBAL STANDARD-SETTING BODIES AND FINANCIAL
INCLUSION: THE EVOLVING LANDSCAPE 46 (March 2016).
47 See e.g., BANK OF ZAMBIA, FINSCOPE ZAMBIA 2015 1 (2015).
48 See Financial Services in Africa, KPMG 4 (2013), https://www.kpmg.com/Africa/en/
IssuesAndInsights/Articles-Publications/Documents/KPMG%20Financial%20Services%20in%20
Africa.pdf; Daniel Runde, M-Pesa And The Rise Of The Global Mobile Money Market, FORBES (Aug. 12,
2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielrunde/2015/08/12/m-pesa-and-the-rise-of-the-global-mobilemoney-market/.
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3. FinTech start-ups
The third major element, and the one that typically receives the most
press attention today, has been the emergence of new entrants, often startups, focused on combining new technology and finance for the benefit of
consumers. While successful FinTech start-ups are by no means new (e.g.
Bloomberg in the 1980s and PayPal in the late 1990s), their numbers and
profile have increased dramatically since 2008. This is reflected in the rise of
the noun “FinTech” (meaning a new start-up company applying technology
to finance). While the focus is often on alternative financial techniques such
as crowdfunding, P2P (peer to peer) lending and robo-advisory services, in
fact, this trend also embraces established IT and ecommerce firms (such as
IBM, Tata, Apple, Amazon, and Alibaba) and new start-ups, all applying
technology to address challenges and create opportunities across the financial
sector.
Today, FinTech impacts every area of the financial system in virtually
every part of the world, with the most dramatic impact perhaps in China,
where technology firms such as Alibaba, Baidu, and Tencent (BATs) have
transformed finance and raised new challenges for regulators and
regulation.49 Furthermore, since 2016 regulators in a range of countries
including the United States, Australia, Singapore, and the UK have been
actively engaged in better understanding FinTech market dynamics and
seeking to develop new regulatory approaches.50
C. RegTech
Unlike the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), we argue that
RegTech cannot be simplified as a category of FinTech. According to the
FCA: “RegTech is a sub-set of FinTech that focuses on technologies that may
facilitate the delivery of regulatory requirements more efficiently and
effectively than existing capabilities.”51 This is a pragmatic assessment of
where RegTech is today, but it is made from an overly narrow perspective.
In our view, this definition lacks vision as to the true potential of

49 See Weihuan Zhou, Douglas W. Arner & Ross P. Buckley, Regulation of Digital Financial
Services in China: Last Mover Advantage, 8 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 25 (2015); Arner & Barberis,
supra note 19.
50 For example, the rationale behind the launch of regulatory sandboxes in the UK, Australia, and
Singapore is that regulators will then be able to support innovation in financial services by collaborating
with industry to better understand FinTech market dynamics. See ASIC, Fintech: ASIC’s Approach and
Regulatory Issues 10–12 (Paper submitted to the 21st Melbourne Money & Finance Conference, July
2016); ASIC, Further Measures to Facilitate Innovation in Financial Services (Consultation Paper No.
260, June 2016).
51 Feedback Statement, Financial Conduct Authority, Call for Input on Supporting the Development
and Adopters of RegTech 3 (2016) (emphasis added).
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RegTech.52 RegTech represents more than just an efficiency tool and rather
is a pivotal change leading to a paradigm shift in regulation. Viewed
holistically, RegTech represents the next logical evolution of financial
services regulation and should develop into a foundational base underpinning
the entire financial services sector.
In the near future, the application of technology to monitoring and
compliance offers massive cost savings to established financial companies
and potentially massive opportunities to emerging FinTech start-ups, IT
firms, and advisory firms.53 From a regulator’s perspective, RegTech enables
the prospect of continuous monitoring that would improve efficiency by both
liberating excess regulatory capital54 and decreasing the time it takes to
investigate a firm following a compliance breach.55 RegTech however offers
more: the potential of continuous monitoring capacity, providing close to
real-time insights, through deep learning and artificial intelligence (AI)
filters, into the functioning of the markets nationally and globally. This
would allow regulators to look forward to identify problems in advance rather
than simply taking enforcement action after the fact. It is this that so excites
Andy Haldane, and for which we argue in this paper. Relative to what
regulators have at their disposal today, this is a profound transformation in
the approach to both finance and its regulation, and one that would certainly
meet with the approval of Captain Kirk’s dour engineer, Scotty.
In the long run, while FinTech is inherently financial in its focus,
52

Id. For a thorough analysis of the FinTech sector, see Arner, Barberis & Buckley, supra note 2.
Adrian Shedden & Gareth Malna, Supporting the Development and Adoption of RegTech: No
Better Time for a Call for Input, BURGES SALMON 2 (Jan. 2016), https://www.burges-salmon.com//media/files/publications/open-access/supporting_the_development_and_adoption_of_regtech_no_
better_time_for_a_call_for_input.pdf.
54 For example, in the case of the new U.S. leverage ratio requirements, banks often complain that
the requirements would force banks to shed liquid assets that would otherwise be needed to maintain the
LCR requirements. In the words of Citigroup’s comment letter on the August 20, 2013 joint agency notice
of proposed rulemaking entitled Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Enhanced Supplementary
Leverage Ratio Standards for Certain Bank Holding Companies and Their Subsidiary Insured Depository
Institutions, “[t]he interaction of different leverage, capital, liquidity, debt and wholesale funding-related
requirements is not well-understood, but in fact may lead to incentives that increase risk in this system, as
banks seek to ‘optimize’ their balance sheet structure across these different requirements.” Comment
Letter from Citigroup, Comment Letter on Regulatory Capital Rules: Enhanced Supplementary Leverage
Ratio Standards for Certain Bank Holding Companies and Their Subsidiary Insured Depository
Institution,
3
(Oct.
21,
2013),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/
2013/October/20131030/R-1460/R-1460_102113_111420_579523237031_1.pdf. Similarly, banks and
trade associations also pointed out that the Net Stable Funding Ratio and its short-term counterpart, the
Liquidity Coverage Ratio, under the U.S. Basel III regime impose unnecessary costs on banks by
“penalizing” securities trading activities. See John Heltman, Long-Term Liquidity Plan Is Costly and
Redundant, Banks Argue, AMERICAN BANKER (Aug. 12, 2016), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/
law-regulation/long-term-liquidity-plan-is-costly-and-redundant-banks-argue-1090708-1.html.
55 Daniel Gutierrez, Big Data for Finance – Security and Regulatory Compliance Considerations,
INSIDE BIG DATA (Oct. 20, 2014), http://insidebigdata.com/2014/10/20/big-data-finance-securityregulatory-compliance-considerations/.
53

382

DOC2 (DO NOT DELETE)

9/18/17 1:12 PM

FinTech and RegTech
37:371 (2017)

RegTech has the potential for application in a wide range of contexts from
monitoring corporations for environmental compliance to monitoring
trucking companies for speeding infractions to tracking the global location
of airliners on a real-time basis. As our financial system moves from one
based on Know-Your-Customer principles to one based on a Know-YourData approach, an entirely new regulatory paradigm that will have to deal
with everything from digital identity to data sovereignty, and that will extend
far beyond the financial sphere, likewise must evolve.
It is therefore critical to distinguish RegTech from FinTech. The
conception that RegTech is a subset of FinTech may come from the fact that
the GFC served to catalyze both developments. However, their underlying
causes were different.
The emergence of RegTech is attributable to: (1) postcrisis regulation
changes requiring massive additional data disclosure from supervised
entities;56 (2) developments in data science (for instance AI and deep
learning) that allow the structuring of unstructured data;57 (3) economic
incentives for participants to minimize rapidly rising compliance costs; and
(4) regulators’ efforts to enhance the efficiency of supervisory tools to foster
competition and uphold their mandates of financial stability (both macro and
micro) and market integrity.58
The emergence of FinTech is attributable to: (1) financial market
deficiencies caused by the GFC and the regulatory response to it; (2) public
distrust in the financial services industry, particularly in the United States
and EU; (3) political pressure for alternative sources of finance for small and
medium enterprises; (4) unemployed financial professionals looking to apply
their talents; and (5) the commoditization of technology and the market
penetration of the internet and mobile phones, particularly smart phones.59
From a market dynamic perspective, FinTech since 2008 has grown
organically as a bottom-up movement led by start-ups and IT firms, whilst
RegTech has grown mainly in response to top-down institutional demand.
RegTech can therefore be seen encompassing three distinct, but
complementary, market sectors and groups of participants.
Firstly (and most advanced at present) financial institutions and the
financial industry are increasingly applying technology to meet the demands
56

See Institute of International Finance, supra note 3, at 5–8.
The IIF identified a number of new technologies that could improve data management and analysis
which include new cryptographic technology, data mining algorithms, machine learning, blockchain,
robotics, and visual analytics. Id. at 12–14.
58 For example, Principle 9 of the BCBS’s “Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision”
requires financial supervisors to use an appropriate range of techniques and tools to effectively implement
the supervisory approach and deploy supervisory resources. This includes a criteria that “[t]he supervisor
uses a variety of tools to regularly review and assess the safety and soundness of banks and the banking
system.” BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING
SUPERVISION 30-31 (2012).
59 Arner, Barberis & Buckley, supra note 2, at 23.
57
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of regulators, especially demands upon large financial institutions in
developed markets arising from new postcrisis regulations.
Secondly, regulators, similar to the financial services industry, are faced
with the need to use technology to address the challenges of monitoring and
enforcing increasingly demanding regulatory requirements on fast-changing,
rapidly growing and cross-border markets. In addition, regulators,
particularly in developing countries and most dramatically in China, are
facing the challenges of the rapid emergence of new FinTech technologies
and entrants, all at unprecedented speed. Regulators are faced with the need
to develop regulatory approaches that do not hinder development and
innovation while still limiting risks to consumers and financial stability.60
Thirdly, and to date still at a very nascent level, policy makers and
regulators will face the challenge of rapidly transforming financial systems
in coming years, and of building the necessary infrastructure to support their
regulation, which will necessitate the increasing use of, and reliance on,
RegTech. This will have to take place in close cooperation with industry
participants of all sorts.
As a result of the above, the development of RegTech so far has
primarily been driven by the financial services industry wishing to decrease
costs,61 especially in light of the fact that regulatory fines and settlements
have increased forty-five fold.62 The next stage is likely to be driven by
regulators seeking to increase their supervisory capacity. We can therefore
expect RegTech to focus more on business-to-business (B2B) solutions in
contrast to the FinTech sector in which a large numbers of companies focus
on business-to-consumer (B2C), as well as B2B, solutions.63
We begin by considering the most developed space in today’s RegTech
landscape: traditional financial institutions.
III. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: COMPLIANCE AND REGTECH
Traditional financial institutions, particularly large global banks, have
60 See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, SUPPORTING RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION IN THE
FEDERAL BANKING SYSTEM: AN OCC PERSPECTIVE (2016).
61 It was reported that JP Morgan Chase added 13,000 employees at a cost of US$2 billion between
2012 and 2014. Likewise, Deutsche Bank and UBS spent respectively EUR1.2 billion and US$946 million
on regulatory demands in 2014. See Institute of International Finance, supra note 4, at 1.
62 Piotr Kaminski & Kate Robu, A Best-Practice Model for Bank Compliance, MCKINSEY, Exhibit 1
(Jan. 2016), http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/risk/our-insights/a-best-practice-model-forbank-compliance.
63 For example, the most highly funded FinTech verticals are in the Payment and Financing space,
which provide direct services to consumers. Furthermore, the rise of challenger banks post-2007 is also
an expression of the public demand and policy motivation to increase heterogeneity within the retail
banking sector in the UK. For additional details on the UK Challenger Banking Space, please refer to
WARREN MEAD, RICHARD IFERENTA & ROBERT HIBBERT, A NEW LANDSCAPE: CHALLENGER BANKING
ANNUAL RESULT (2016).
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been the major drivers of the post-2008 evolution of RegTech, stemming
from their appetite for efficient tools with which to deal with massive new
and complex regulatory and compliance demands. Financial institutions
began applying technology intensively to risk management and compliance
in the 1990s, with regulators placing a high level of trust and reliance on such
systems. However, the GFC fundamentally altered that paradigm. Since the
crisis, regulators globally have implemented far reaching and extensive
regulatory reforms and compliance requirements, which have driven the
evolution of IT and compliance in major financial institutions worldwide. In
order to address these challenges, global firms are now developing global
centralized risk management and compliance functions in order to address
the changed regulatory and compliance environments.64
A. Globalization of Finance and the Development of RegTech
The history of global financial regulation is in large measure the story
of regulatory initiatives in response to crisis. For example, the extensive
financial liberalization and deregulation of the 1970s was followed by the
Developing Country Debt Crisis of 1982, which in turn provided the impetus
for the first Basel Accord on capital adequacy in the late 1980s.65
This was an iterative process of liberalization, followed by crisis, and
then reactive regulatory responses.66 As markets became more international
from the late 1960s and increasingly global from the 1980s, domestic
regulation became increasingly inadequate to address the challenges of crossborder, international, and global financial markets and institutions. In
response, a network of cooperative arrangements between policy makers and
global standard-setting bodies gradually evolved to address new risks arising
from the internationalization and globalization of finance. This network was
centered on organizations including the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS), the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee), the
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), the Financial
Stability Forum, and the Group of Seven (G-7) Industrialized Countries.67
These organizations, comprised primarily of domestic regulatory agencies
from major developed financial markets, came together following each major
crisis (Herstatt in the 1970s, the Developing Country Debt Crisis of the
1980s, the Mexican and Asian Financial Crises, and the failures of BCCI and
64

See EY, CENTRALIZED OPERATIONS - THE FUTURE OF OPERATING MODELS FOR RISK, CONTROL

AND COMPLIANCE FUNCTIONS (2014).
65

Capital Standards for Banks: The Evolving Basel Accord (Federal Reserve Bulletin), Sep. 2003.
For the development of this framework, see Buckley & Arner, supra note 2.
67 Lawrence G. Baxter, Understanding the Global in Global Finance and Regulation, in
RECONCEPTUALIZING GLOBAL FINANCE AND ITS REGULATION 28-48 (Ross Buckley et al. eds., 2016); see
generally CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE MAKING IN THE
21ST CENTURY (2011).
66
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Barings of the 1990s) to agree on further coordinated regulatory responses to
prevent similar problems in future. Major examples of such “soft law”
financial regulatory agreements thus developed include the 1988 Basel
Capital Accord (Basel I),68 its replacement (Basel II),69 and the FATF’s 40
Recommendations.70
From the standpoint of financial institutions, the period from the late
1960s to the 2008 GFC was one of continual expansion in scope and scale,
culminating in huge global financial conglomerates.71 This took place
through organic growth and more significantly through mergers and
acquisitions, with the merger of Travelers and Citibank to form Citigroup in
1999 being paradigmatic (as illustrated in Figure 1.0).72

Figure 1. Infographic based on information from the Federal Reserve and GAO
depicting how thirty-seven banks became the “Big Four” between 1990 and 2009.

68 See BIS, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS
(1998).
69 See BIS, BASEL II: INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL
STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK – COMPREHENSIVE VERSION (2006).
70 See FATF, FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS (Oct. 2003); Brummer, supra note 67.
71 See Ross P. Buckley, The Changing Nature of Banking and Why It Matters, in
RECONCEPTUALIZING GLOBAL FINANCE AND ITS REGULATION 9-27 (Ross Buckley, et al. eds., 2016).
72 How 37 Banks in 1990s Became 4 Banks in 2009, Mega Consolidation in US, LET’S TALK
PAYMENTS, (Jan, 29, 2014), https://letstalkpayments.com/37-banks-1999-2009-became-4-banks-todaymega-consolidation/ (citing Federal Reserve; GAO).
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Source: How Banks Got Too Big to Fail, MOTHER JONES (Jan.–Feb. 2010),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2010/01/bank-merger-history/#.

As financial institutions expanded their scope and scale across
jurisdictions and sectors, they faced increasing operational and regulatory
challenges. This led to a major expansion of risk management and legal and
compliance activities, particularly throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Risk
management from the 1980s was increasingly achieved by using financial
technology as finance became increasingly quantitative and IT became ever
more powerful. The combination of quantitative finance and IT was reflected
in the emergence of financial engineering and Value at Risk (VaR) systems
in major financial institutions.73 These systems were a major element of the
transformation of finance prior to the GFC, but also one of the greatest risks
and failures underlying the crisis itself.74 Put simply, by the early twenty-first
century, the financial industry—particularly very large global financial
institutions and their staff, management, and shareholders—had become
overly confident in the ability to manage and control risks through the
application of quantitative finance and IT.75
Regulators too became overly confident in the ability of this quantitative
IT framework to manage risks, as is demonstrated by the heavy reliance of
the Basel II Capital Accord on quantitative internal risk management systems
of major global financial institutions.76 Essentially, regulators outsourced
major aspects of financial regulation to the largest industry participants and
their internal risk control mechanisms.
These two aspects of reliance on quantitative risk management systems
by industry and regulators could be viewed as the first iteration of RegTech,
73 See Joe Nocera, Risk Management – What Led to the Financial Meltdown, NY TIMES (Jan. 2,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/magazine/04risk-t.html.
74 The VaR model is unreliable in many ways. See Simon Johnson & James Kwak, Seduced by a
Model, NY TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (Oct. 1, 2009), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/01/
seduced-by-a-model/. (“VAR depends on three assumptions that are generally false: not all assets,
particularly illiquid ones, are included in the VAR calculation; estimates are based on past data that is
unrepresentative of the future; and because financial returns exhibit ‘fat tails’ (extreme outcomes are more
likely than you would expect), VAR estimates tell you very little about how bad things can get that last 1
percent of the time.”). For an empirical study on the limitations of the VaR model, see Andreas Krause,
Exploring the Limitations of Value at Risk: How Good Is It in Practice?, 4 J. RISK FIN. 19 (2003).
75 Overreliance on financial technology such as VaR (estimated through the use of Gaussian copula
function) that allowed hugely complex risks to be modelled was perhaps what destroyed Wall Street
according to one commentator. Felix Salmon, The Formula that Killed Wall Street, 9 SIGNIFICANCE 16
(2012).
76 See Harald Benink & George Kaufman, Turmoil Reveals the Inadequacy of Basel II, FIN. TIMES,
(Feb. 27, 2008), https://www.ft.com/content/0e8404a2-e54e-11dc-9334-0000779fd2ac.; Staffs of the
International Monetary Fund and The World Bank, Implementation of Basel II – Implications for the
World Bank and the IMF, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (July 22, 2005), http://www.imf.org/
external/np/pp/eng/2005/072205.htm#s2.
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a sort of RegTech 1.0. Unfortunately, this precrisis partnership between the
financial industry and its regulators, based on quantitative internal risk
management systems, provided a false sense of security and confidence77 that
was shattered by the 2008 GFC.
B. RegTech in the Financial Services Industry: Impact of the 2008
Global Financial Crisis
To date, traditional financial institutions and their risk management and
compliance needs have been the primary driver of, and market for, RegTech
solutions. While the financial services industry has long been a major user of
automated reporting and compliance tools, increased regulatory costs since
2008 have enhanced the incentive to shift quickly to adopt digitization and
automation of processes as the default method of meeting regulatory
obligations.
The emergence of RegTech can be largely attributed to the complex,
fragmented and ever-evolving post-GFC global financial regulatory regime.
Over-reliance on complex, prescriptive and lengthy post-GFC regulations led
to massive compliance and supervision costs for the regulated and the
regulators. Carrying out financial supervision, in response to the growing
level of regulatory complexity, inevitably required greater granularity,
precision and frequency in data reporting, aggregation, and analysis.78
Examples can be easily found in the case of capital and liquidity
regulations under Basel III, stress testing and risk assessments in the UK,
United States, EU, and elsewhere, and the reporting requirements imposed
on OTC derivatives transactions resulting from Group of 20 (G20) and
Financial Stability Board (FSB) agreed approaches and as implemented (in
conflicting fashions) in the context of Dodd-Frank or the EU’s EMIR.79
Compliance costs rose significantly as a result of the increasing regulatory
burden that made the use of innovative technologies a natural and promising
solution to compliance requirements.80 As reported by Let’s Talk Payments,
77 One example is that Basel II’s Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) approach was perceived to achieve
two major goals: the enhancement of risk sensitivity, and the promotion of incentive compatibility.
Nevertheless, in hindsight, the pursuit of risk sensitivity was mostly accomplished by banks pushing assets
off their balance sheets, leading to a false sense of security.
78 Institute of International Finance, supra note 3, at 5–8.
79 Id. at 7. For discussion in the context of the US, see FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL,
STUDY ON THE EFFECTS OF SIZE AND COMPLEXITY OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ON CAPITAL MARKET
EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH CARRIED OUT AT THE DIRECTION OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL (March 2016).
80 See Eleanor Hill, Is RegTech the Answer to the Rising Cost of Compliance?, FX-MM (June 13,
2016),
http://www.fx-mm.com/50368/fx-mm-magazine/past-issues/june-2016/regtech-rising-costcompliance/ (noting that “[a]s rules of thumb go, judging regulatory complexity by the amount of
paperwork being issued by global regulators is not a bad proxy. Between 2009 and 2014, G20 regulators
increased their document output by 500%”); Andrew Cornell, AgTech, ResTech, RegTech, FinTech –
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“[t]he annual spending by financial institutions on compliance is estimated
to be in excess of US $70 billion.”81 In this situation it is no wonder the
industry turned to RegTech for cost-effective solutions.
Second, the deepening regulatory fragmentation displayed in many
different markets has given rise to an additional layer of compliance burdens
for financial institutions. Despite the push by global policy makers for similar
postcrisis reforms, the requirements and rules for implementing these
reforms range from being slightly different to significantly dissimilar
between markets. The overlaps and contradictions in regulations led financial
institutions to turn to RegTech to optimize compliance management.82
Third, the rapidly evolving nature of the postcrisis regulatory landscape
introduced uncertainty on future regulatory requirements which put a
premium on financial institutions enhancing their adaptability in regulatory
compliance.83 The use of RegTech may have taught financial institutions how
to ensure compliance in a changing dynamic environment through iterative
modeling and testing.
Last but not least, the regulators themselves are becoming motivated to
explore the use of RegTech to ensure financial institutions comply with
regulations in a responsive manner.84 The use of RegTech can add value to
regulators by helping them understand, in closer to real-time, innovative
products and complex transactions, market manipulation, internal fraud, and
risks,85 which we discuss in Part IV.
According to the Spanish international bank BBVA, financial industry
RegTech focuses on:
The automation of manual processes and the links between steps in
analytical/reporting processes, the improvement of data quality, the
creation of a holistic view of data, the automated analysis of data with
applications that are able to learn during the process, and the
generation of meaningful reports that can be sent to regulators and
Actual Solutions or Techno-Babble?, ANZ BLUE NOTES (Feb. 23, 2016), https://bluenotes.anz.com/
posts/2016/02/is-regtech-the-answer-to-billions-being-spent-on-compliance-and-reporting/;
James
Eyers, Welcome to the New World of RegTech, FIN. REVIEW (June 20, 2016), http://www.afr.com/
technology/welcome-to-the-new-world-of-regtech-20160619-gpmj6k.
81 Kate, A Report on Global RegTech: A $100-Billion Opportunity – Market Overview, Analysis of
Incumbents and Startups, LET’S TALK PAYMENTS (April 18, 2016), https://letstalkpayments.com/areport-on-global-regtech-a-100-billion-opportunity-market-overview-analysis-of-incumbents-andstartups/.
82 See Hill, supra note 80.
83 See id.
84 In fact, some financial regulators are keen to embrace innovation in regulatory techniques. See
Eyers, supra note 80 (observing that Australia’s ASIC chairman, Greg Medcraft, says “ASIC has been
thinking about regtech for several years – since before the term has emerged. ASIC is about to establish
a dedicated regtech team, and its staff will begin working with researchers.”).
85 See Hannah Augur, Regtech: The 2016 Buzzword is Turning Heads, DATACONOMY (May 3, 2016),
http://dataconomy.com/regtech-the-2016-buzzword-is-turning-heads/.
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used internally to improve key business decision making.86

In other words, RegTech embodies technological solutions to improved
regulatory processes and related compliance. Additionally, new
technological developments (such as AI and machine learning) allow for new
forms of market monitoring or reporting processes which were previously
not possible.87 Indeed, the Bank of England is closely looking at the evolution
of RegTech, stating that:
“Firms have started to make progress in response to the limitations of
existing surveillance solutions, including the use of new technology and
analytics which go beyond the key-word surveillance and simple statistical
checks previously used by firms to detect improper trading activity . . .”88
As noted, this has been driven in the first instance by postcrisis
regulatory reforms and the demands of regulators, with the application of
technology the enabling factor. Leading examples include anti-money
laundering (AML) and know-your-client (KYC) compliance requirements
and prudential regulatory reporting and stress testing compliance
requirements.
1. AML and KYC
As previously mentioned, FATF, an organization of developed country
governments established in 1989 and hosted by the OECD, establishes
international soft law standards that address money laundering and terrorist
financing. The 40 Recommendations of the FATF have now been
implemented into the domestic legal systems of most jurisdictions in the
international financial system.89 While the FATF does not have a formal
treaty-based structure, its pronouncements nonetheless have wide impact,
with noncompliant jurisdictions and financial institutions at risk of having
their access to major markets such as the United States and EU limited by
those domestic regulators. In addition to the FATF and its Recommendations,
the UN is also active in issuing sanctions lists of prohibited or restricted
countries, firms and individuals.90 Unlike FATF Recommendations, UN
86 See Santiago Fernandez De Lis et, all., RegTech, the New Magic Word in FinTech, BBVA
Research 1, 14 (March 2016), https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/BankingOutlook-Q116_Cap6.pdf.
87 See Institute of International Finance, supra note 3, at 11–14.
88 Charles Roxburgh et al., Fair and Effective Market Review: Final Report (June 2015),
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/femrjun15.pdf (emphasis added).
89 FATF, International Standards on Combinating Money Laundering and the Financing of
Terrorism & Proliferation: the FAFTA Recommendations, (Feb. 2012), http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf.
90 UN Counter-Terrorism Implantation Task Force, Tackling the Financing of Terrorism, United
Nations 1, 3, 9 (Oct. 2009), http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ctitf/pdfs/ctitf_financing_eng_final.pdf. See
also Id. at 19. (“Under Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999) and its successors, the Security Council
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sanctions lists do in fact have a formal international legal basis.
The impact of both FATF rules and UN sanctions on the operations of
financial institutions around the world has been dramatic, with AML
operations within large financial institutions often forming a major division
tasked with implementing AML rules and the sanctions imposed by the
various jurisdictions in which the institution operates, particularly those of
its home jurisdiction and of the United States (given the primacy of the U.S.
dollar in international transactions and U.S. activism in enforcement). In
addition to operations of individual financial institutions, infrastructure
providers such as SWIFT and CLS are important implementers of AML and
sanctions.91
Despite the 40 Recommendations being an internationally agreed,
harmonized standard, they must still be implemented in the domestic legal
systems of individual jurisdictions. The result is that although the standards
are common, the details of their implementation from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction may vary. Within individual jurisdictions there may even be
differential implementation across regulatory authorities (for example, the
banking regulator and the securities regulator may have slightly different
requirements in implementing an internationally agreed standard).
From the standpoint of compliance, a number of issues arise.
First, every client or potential client of a financial institution must be
reviewed under the central element of the AML requirements, that of
knowing one’s customer. This is an intensive process that requires
documentation of identity, income, source of funds, and the like, at a deeper
than surface level. For a large financial institution with operations in multiple
countries with thousands of customers, this is a demanding process that is
generally established and implemented through the firm’s internal IT, risk
management, and compliance systems.92
Second, because of differences between the requirements of individual
jurisdictions, firms operating across multiple markets have to implement
systems (usually IT-based) that address not only the general global
requirements, but also the specific requirements of individual markets, and
in some cases of individual regulatory authorities within those markets.93
Third, the United States in particular has been very active, especially
post-9/11, in enforcing its rules on not only U.S. financial institutions but
also foreign financial institutions with operations in the United States. A
compiles a publicly available list of sanctioned individuals and entities associated with the Taliban, AlQaida, Osama bin Laden.”); Id. at 3 (“targeted financial sanctions against individuals, involving the
freezing of assets.”).
91 For SWIFT’s Financial Crime Compliance framework, see relevant materials at
https://www.swift.com/our-solutions/compliance-and-shared-services/financial-crime-compliance/
about-compliance/document-centre.
92 See Institute of International Finance, supra note 3, at 10.
93 See id.

391

DOC2 (DO NOT DELETE)

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

9/18/17 1:12 PM

37:371 (2017)

number of major financial institutions including HSBC, Standard Chartered,
Barclays and BNP Paribas have been subjected to U.S. regulatory action for
AML violations, sanctions violations, or both, resulting in large fines from
U.S. federal and New York state regulators.94 These actions against major
financial institutions have typically resulted in deferred prosecution
agreements, one requirement of which is typically the implementation of
global systems of AML and sanctions compliance meeting US standards
throughout the entire global operations of the firm.
Fourth, a core aspect of AML requirements is the reporting of suspicious
transactions. Such requirements include both subjective elements (for
instance unusual account behavior) as well as objective elements (e.g.
reporting of any cash transaction over a certain size, often $10,000).95 The
investigation and reporting process within a large financial institution is a
major operation that requires significant resources, both human (at the
moment) and IT.
This combination of factors has meant that AML and KYC has been a
particular focus of RegTech spending and development within major
financial institutions and in IT and advisory firms and start-ups, such that the
majority of RegTech solutions to date have focused on KYC compliance.96
2. Prudential regulatory reporting and stress testing
The general features underlying the rapid development of RegTech in
the AML and KYC context also underpin the development of RegTech in the
prudential regulatory reporting and stress testing context.
Like AML and KYC requirements, prudential regulatory reporting
requirements were a major feature of financial regulation and compliance
prior to the GFC. These were typically embedded in capital and trading
reporting requirements.97 While trading reporting requirements primarily
focused on exchange traded activities and were designed to address issues of
market conduct (in particular market manipulation and insider trading),
capital requirements focused on the prudential safety and soundness of the
individual financial institution.98
94 See, e.g., Martin Arnold & Sam Fleming, Regulation: Banks Count the Risks and Rewards Crackdown on Money Laundering Threatens to Leave Parts of Developing World Cut Off from Global
Finance, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/9df378a2-66bb-11e4-91ab00144feabdc0.
95 FAFTA, Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Measures and Financial Inclusion, 56, 40-41 (Feb. 2013); available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/AML_CFT_
Measures_and_Financial_Inclusion_2013.pdf.
96 See Paymann, Fintech Companies in Fraud Prevention, KYC and Security, FinTech Valley (Sept.
28,
2015),
https://fintechvalley.org/2015/09/28/fintech-companies-in-fraud-prevention-kyc-andsecurity/.
97 See Institute of International Finance, supra note 3, at 6–9, 11.
98 See Edward v. Murphy, Who Regulates Whom and How? An Overview of U.S. Financial
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Capital requirements have been a major focus of cross-border regulatory
cooperation since the 1980s, when the original Basel I Capital Accord was
developed in response to insufficient levels of capital in internationally active
financial institutions after the 1980s Developing Country Debt Crisis.99
While initially fairly simple, throughout the 1990s Basel I was subject to a
series of amendments which steadily increased its complexity and related
compliance costs.100 Of these, the amendments to extend the framework from
credit risk to market risk and to recognize netting in derivatives contracts
were probably the most significant, with the former’s use of internal models
forming an important element of Basel II.
Basel II, developed in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis,
was designed to bring together regulatory, economic and accounting capital
into a single state-of-the-art market friendly framework.101 This reflected the
consensus view of the reliability of quantitative financial risk management
systems (despite some evidence to the contrary provided by the rescue of
LTCM in 1999). Basel II thus extended the internal models-based approach,
initiated by the Basel I Market Risk Amendment in 1995, to all aspects of
capital regulation.102 Effectively, financial regulators outsourced the setting
of capital requirements to large financial institutions themselves.
Following the GFC, attention has focused on the development of Basel
III, designed to dramatically increase capital (particularly equity capital),
reduce leverage, enhance liquidity, and implement systems of crisis
management for individual institutions, including by limiting reliance on
firms’ own internal risk modeling systems.103 This is a massive framework
in its internationally agreed soft law form, and it will be even more
substantial when implemented in the legal and regulatory systems of
Regulation Policy for Banking and Securities Market, Congressional Research Service 1, 16 (Jan. 30,
2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43087.pdf.
99 Christopher Alessi, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Council on Foreign Relations,
(July 11, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/banks-and-banking/basel-committee-banking-supervision/p28694.
(referring to Daniel Tarullo, Banking on Basel: The Future of International Financial Regulation (2008));
Smitha Francis, The Revised Basel Capital Accord: The Logic, Content and Potential Impact for
Developing Countries (Working Paper No. 09, 2006).
100 See Andrew G. Haldane, Exe. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of England, & Vasileios Madouros, Econ.,
Bank of England, The Dog and The Frisbee, Bank of Int’ Settlement,1, 6–8 (Aug. 31, 2012),
http://www.bis.org/review/r120905a.pdf. (Explaining how the “Tower of Basel” gets extremely complex
and “thicker” from only 30 pages long to at least a 616 page-long accord document).
101 Francis, supra note 99.
102 See BIS, An International Model-Based Approach to Market Risk Capital Requirements (April
1995).
103 In December 2010, the BCBS published the Basel III documents “Basel III: A Global Regulatory
Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems” (a revised version was published in June
2011) and “Basel III: International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and
Monitoring” (a revised version was published in January 2013). The term “Basel III” basically means the
regulatory structure and standards set forth by these documents. For a clear and comprehensive summary
of Basel III, see ACCENTURE, BASEL III HANDBOOK (2010).
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individual jurisdictions.
As with AML, prudential regulation requires global institutions to
understand, monitor and report all aspects of their activities to regulators in
the jurisdictions in which they operate. These requirements continue to
multiply, with daily reporting of thousands of data points to multiple
regulators in different jurisdictions now being the norm for a large,
internationally active bank.104 Such requirements mean that financial
institutions have to be able to produce the necessary data at the required
frequency in the form required by each individual regulator. While the
overall approaches may be harmonized, the details frequently are not.105
Development of significant compliance teams and IT systems to implement
these requirements has thus been a major focus since 2008, with continual
evolution of requirements as each stage of the G20/FSB reforms are agreed
and implemented in individual jurisdictions.
Unlike the situation pre-crisis, regulators no longer rely on the internal
risk management systems of individual financial institutions to produce
appropriate levels of capital for economic, regulatory and accounting
purposes, but instead have established complex rules to set capital, leverage,
and liquidity at levels sufficient to protect financial stability, all backed up
with periodic reviews and “stress tests.”106 These changes have increased the
demand for RegTech solutions for the financial industry.
As we argue in this Part, these regulatory requirements also necessitate
the ever-increasing application of technology by regulators in order to
monitor the rivers of data being sent to them. All this demand for RegTech
solutions is providing opportunities for established advisory and technology
firms as well as start-ups.
C. RegTech: A FinTech Opportunity
In addition to regulatory factors, RegTech is also being driven by
FinTech developments. Examples include:107

104 See generally, Deloitte, Forward Look: Top Regulatory Trends for 2016 in Banking 1, 9 (2015),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/finance/us-outlooks-top-regulatorytrends-for-2016-in-banking-reg.PDF.
105 This is probably the reason that some private sector standards promoters, such as ISO and the IIF,
call for data standardization and definition harmonization. See Institute of International Finance, supra
note 3, at 10.
106 See e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM & FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, REGULATORY CAPITAL
RULES: REGULATORY CAPITAL, IMPLEMENTATION OF BASEL III, MINIMUM REGULATORY CAPITAL
RATIOS, CAPITAL ADEQUACY, TRANSITION PROVISIONS, AND PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION (2012).
107 See Chappuis Halder & Co., FCA – RegTech: Call for Input: Supporting the Development and
Adoption of RegTech 12 (Jan. 2016), http://www.slideshare.net/NicolasHeguy/chco-supporting-thedevelopment-and-adoption-of-regtech.
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• AML and KYC requirements. AML and KYC requirements
established by the FATF and the Basel Committee and implemented by
domestic regulators around the world have been a driving force in the
demand for RegTech solutions, in particular for technology to simplify
and automate processes across the firm and to ensure compliance with
applicable rules around the world, including suspicious transaction
identification and reporting.108 An increasing range of IT firms, advisory
firms, and start-ups are involved, with clear opportunities for future
development.
• Reporting and data submission framework (e.g. Basel III, DoddFrank).109 As noted above, postcrisis regulatory changes have
dramatically increased financial industry reporting requirements,
particularly for large financial institutions. A key aspect of financial
institution RegTech involves building strategic platforms to aggregate
all the data needed to comply with stress testing requirements. At a more
advanced level, there is an opportunity for both established institutions
and start-ups to provide near real-time data analysis and customized
reporting.
• Capital assessment and Stress testing (CCAR, AQR).110 In addition
to reporting requirements, capital requirements and related stress testing
emerging from postcrisis reforms are major drivers of RegTech in the
financial industry. Advanced analytics capabilities can be used to design
models and evaluate how thousands of variables impact financial
institutions.
• Trading book risk management (Volcker, MiFID).111 New
regulations addressing trading have added complexity to the compliance
requirements of global firms, particularly those facing different
requirements in different jurisdictions. Algorithms can control the
margin requirements for each transaction and manage the market risk of
traders’ portfolios.
Clearly, we are still at a fairly early stage in this process, but its
evolution is developing rapidly.
D. Looking Forward: Shared Services Utility and Global
108 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision mainly promotes the implementation of AML and
CFT standards through issuing guidelines. BASEL COMM’ ON BANKING SUPERVISION, SOUND
MANAGEMENT OF RISKS RELATED TO MONEY LAUNDERING AND FINANCING OF TERRORISM (2016).
109 See International Institute of Finance, supra note 3, at 6–8.
110 See id. at 8–9.
111 See id. at 11.
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Compliance
In 2014, Goldman Sachs broke ground on a new campus in Bangalore
(Bengaluru), India, with capacity for 9,000 staff.112 Bangalore is already
Goldman’s second largest office (with approximately 6,000 staff, compared
to 12,000 in New York). Other major financial institutions, including JP
Morgan, Citibank, Morgan Stanley, Barclays, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, and
Standard Chartered, among others, have large proportions of their staff in
centralized support operations in India, especially in Bangalore, Mumbai,
New Delhi, and Chennai. These are no longer primarily traditional back
offices or call center operations but rather are increasingly focused on
integrated global risk management and regulatory compliance. For instance,
in the context of customer on-boarding, account opening, and KYC
operations, these functions may be centralized in India (or elsewhere) for the
entire operations of a global financial services firm.113
Likewise, in the context of the extensive reporting requirements of
prudential regulators around the world, particularly resulting from postcrisis
reforms, financial institutions now look to centralized operations to gather
the necessary data globally on a real-time basis so that, in the first instance,
the institution and its management has a much clearer picture of operations
and risks, and in the second instance, so that the information can be
repackaged as necessary to meet the requirements of regulators around the
world.114 Ironically, these operations look a great deal like pre-2008 trading
floors, with rows of desks with telephones and multiple screens to allow
continuous monitoring and communication across the institution.
From a regulatory standpoint, these operations are interesting:
generally, they are separately incorporated subsidiaries and are not regulated
as banks in their host jurisdiction, as they are not conducting “banking”
activities requiring licensing and regulation. Rather, they are often subject to
the domestic outsourcing rules of the jurisdictions of the group entities for
which they provide support.115
The result is the emergence of an entirely different way of addressing
compliance, one driven by technology and regulatory change and comprising
the most sophisticated level of RegTech today, what one could call the first
element of a new postcrisis RegTech 2.0. From this it should be clear that the
112 See Goldman Sachs to Invest Rs 1,200 Crore in Bangalore, THE TIMES OF INDIA (Sep. 25, 2014),
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Goldman-Sachs-to-invest-Rs-1200-crore-inBangalore/articleshow/43383998.cms.
113 See BEARING POINT, SURVEY: SHARED SERVICES INDUSTRY SPECIFICS AND TRENDS IN THE
EUROPEAN FS MARKET 7–10 (2011).
114 See EY, CENTRALIZED OPERATIONS - THE FUTURE OF OPERATING MODELS FOR RISK, CONTROL
AND COMPLIANCE FUNCTIONS (2014).
115 For a summary of the regulatory issues concerned with shared services, see DELOITTE, SHARED
SERVICES HANDBOOK: HIT THE ROAD (2011).
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increasing prevalence of RegTech in industry requires regulators to adapt and
adopt technology within their own internal processes, which comprises the
second element of postcrisis RegTech 2.0 and is the subject of Part IV.
IV. REGULATORS: COPING WITH COMPLIANCE
The common view is that regulators are under-resourced in terms of
human capital and budgets, especially when it comes to acquiring and
implementing technology. While as a general proposition this is almost
certainly true and one of the main barriers to the development of RegTech
within the regulatory community (and particularly in the context of
developing countries), regulators have had some notable successes in the
context of technology and regulation.116
It is certain, however, that relative to the private sector there has been a
lag in regulator adoption of RegTech. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that
large market incidents have prompted regulatory (re)action. In particular,
regulators have actively used technology since the 1980s to monitor and
enforce market integrity in exchange traded securities markets, with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) providing the global lead.117 In
addition, as discussed in Part III, regulators and the financial industry have
long worked closely in the evolution of robust technological and regulatory
solutions to issues regarding cross-border electronic payment systems as well
as securities trading and settlement systems. However, with the rapidly
growing amount of information reported to regulators and new technology
such as AI and deep learning, there seems to be great potential for more to
be done in terms of automating market supervision, consumer protection, and
prudential regulation.118 In addition, regulators are being challenged by the
pace of FinTech innovation, with this challenge being particularly acute in
developing countries.
A. RegTech: A Regulator’s Tool for the Twenty-First Century
The evolution of RegTech in the financial industry discussed in Part III,
particularly RegTech developed by large global financial institutions and
infrastructure providers such as payment systems, securities exchanges, and
116 We can observe this from the perspective of how technology changes and impacts the exercise of
regulatory supervision and oversight in the field of securities regulation. Chris Brummer, Disruptive
Technology and Securities Regulation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 977 (2015).
117 See, e.g., SEC, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF RECENT TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES
ON THE SECURITIES MARKETS (1997); see also TECH. COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N,
REGULATORY ISSUES RAISED BY THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES ON MARKET INTEGRITY
AND EFFICIENCY (2011) (providing an overview of the major movements the SEC has led in regulation).
118 See Maryam M. Najafabadi et al., Deep Learning Applications and Challenges in Big Data
Analytics, 2 J. BIG DATA 1 (2015).
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clearing and settlement systems, highlights the rate of change within the
industry itself. However, the regulators themselves provide an example of
the gap between IT-enabled systems in the industry and the lack of ITenabled solutions among regulators. This gap, now quite wide, is one
regulators are beginning to become increasingly aware of due to the simple
necessity of dealing with the masses of reports and data that post-GFC
regulatory changes have required industry to deliver to them.119 Given that
these data streams are designed to ensure financial stability and market
integrity, it is essential for regulators to develop systems to appropriately
monitor and analyze these regulatory datasets.
B. Big Data: Matching Reporting with Analytical Tools
AML and KYC has so far provided one of the most fertile areas for the
development of RegTech in the financial services industry in the postcrisis
period.120 However, the information being produced by the financial services
industry (particularly suspicious transactions reports) provides an example of
an area where regulators are beginning to consider technological solutions to
assist in monitoring and analysis and one where failure to do so would in fact
largely defeat the intended regulatory objectives.
Failure by regulators to develop the IT capabilities to use the data
provided in response to reporting requirements would severely impact the
achievement of the policy objectives of such reporting requirements.121 This
also provides an important opportunity for collaboration between regulators
and academia (particularly quantitative finance and economics academics
who have highly developed capabilities in analyzing datasets and a constant
hunger for new datasets to analyze). Such collaboration offers great potential
benefit to regulators and academics in supporting financial stability, market
integrity, and a greater understanding of market behavior and dynamics.122
119 For example, the UK Government Office of Science has acknowledged that “[a]t a time when
institutions are asked to provide unprecedented quantities of data, there remains doubt about the
regulators’ ability to measure risk and use such risk measurements in determining prudential regulatory
regimes. This doubt is understandable, as much of recent prudential regulation has been designed and
implemented in a constrained period of time, yet addresses complicated and evolving problems such as
systemic risk measurement.” UK GOV’T CHIEF SCI. ADVISER, FIN TECH FUTURES - THE UK AS A WORLD
LEADER IN FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGIES 48 (Mar. 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/413095/gs-15-3-fintech-futures.pdf.
120 To the extent that KYC is to RegTech what P2P was to FinTech: an immediately relatable
posterchild.
121 Ravi Kalakota, RegTech – Regulatory/Risk Data Management, AML, and KYC Analytics,
PRACTICAL ANALYTICS (Jan. 17, 2013), https://practicalanalytics.co/2013/01/17/data-management-amland-kyc-analytics/; see also KPMG, TEN KEY REGULATORY CHALLENGES FACING THE BANKING &
CAPITAL MARKETS INDUSTRY IN 2016 2 (2015).
122 Such collaboration among regulators, academia and businesses has also been highlighted in the
FinTech Report by the UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser. See UK GOV’T CHIEF SCI. ADVISER,
supra note 119, at 52.

398

DOC2 (DO NOT DELETE)

9/18/17 1:12 PM

FinTech and RegTech
37:371 (2017)

An area where regulators have been successful in using technology to
monitor and analyze markets over the past twenty years is in reporting of
transactions in public securities markets. Today, regulators rely heavily on
the trade reporting systems of securities exchanges to detect unusual behavior
which can serve as a trigger for further analysis and potential regulatory
investigation and enforcement;123 for instance, trading on inside information
in advance of a major corporate event, such as a merger or acquisition.
Securities exchanges maintain data on all trades so it is a simple matter to
review trading activity prior to an announcement of a merger or acquisition
to look for unusual trading activity. Such activity is then investigated for
possible misconduct, which if indicated may form the basis of an
enforcement action. Such systems provide an excellent example of RegTech
1.0 in the precrisis period.
Since the GFC, such systems have been shown to be limited by their
lack of information on activities taking place off the exchanges. This is a
clear concern given that the majority of trading in many major securities
markets now takes place off-exchange via Electronic Communication
Networks (ECNs) and “dark pools.”124 Regulatory changes in the United
States and EU are set to change this by mandating reporting of all transactions
in listed securities, whether or not those transactions take place via a formal
exchange or an off-exchange electronic system. Such reporting requirements
must likewise be matched with IT systems within regulators themselves to
monitor and analyze information presented.
This is the approach regulators must apply across their regulatory roles.
This is the second element of an emerging RegTech 2.0. We argue however
that it is necessary to move beyond this level and to develop a new approach.
C. Cybersecurity
The question of cybersecurity in finance highlights the necessity of
further regulatory development.125 In particular, the digital transformation of
finance (the FinTech process) has made the industry far more vulnerable to
attack. Indeed, as the financial services industry continues to evolve into a
digitized data-based industry, there is an increasing risk of attack, theft, and
fraud from hackers (and other cybercriminal activity). The 2016 Bangladesh
central bank heist, implemented via SWIFT, has shown the vulnerabilities of
existing frameworks, with the recent Yahoo hack providing further evidence
of the potential risks.
Likewise, the 2008 GFC highlighted the public good and public order
123 THE BD. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES TO EFFECTIVE
MARKET SURVEILLANCE ISSUES AND REGULATORY TOOLS: CONSULTATION REPORT 14–15 (2012).
124 Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, Shedding Light on Dark Pools, S.E.C. (Nov. 18, 2015),
http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/shedding-light-on-dark-pools.html#_edn5.
125 See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, FSOC 2016 ANNUAL REPORT (2016).
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role of the financial sector, so that the financial sector and financial stability
are not only economic issues but also national security issues.
Not surprisingly, this is an area of focus for regulators and one
increasingly at the center of international attention from organizations such
as the FSB and Basel Committee.126 This is in addition to the very natural
attention placed on the issue by financial institutions themselves:
cybersecurity is one of the most significant risks faced by the financial
industry, particularly as the digitization and centralization of processes
continues.127 Likewise for new FinTech start-ups, cybersecurity should be a
key concern as these data intensive companies often have a limited
comprehension or perceived need of security as they live in a digital world
with an abundance of data. Whilst money has scarcity, which drove the
development of secure vaults and payment systems, data abundance may not
create the right incentive for firms (beyond reputation risks) and can clearly
harm consumers.
Cybersecurity is thus the clearest example of how FinTech demands
RegTech. However, the area with perhaps the greatest potential for RegTech
is macroprudential policy.
D. Macroprudential Policy
Prior to the GFC, the focus of prudential and financial stability
regulation was very much on the safety and soundness of individual financial
institutions, particularly banks. This was premised on the idea that if each
individual bank was financially safe and sound, then the financial system as
a whole would likewise be stable. The GFC fundamentally altered this view,
and since 2008, there has been a new focus on macroprudential policy, with
the G20 tasking the IMF, FSB, and BIS to focus on the development of
related early warning systems to prevent the build-up of risks that lead to
financial crises, with the overall intention, whenever possible, to prevent
crises from happening (or at the least minimize their severity).
Macroprudential policy focuses on the stability of the entire financial system,
based on a holistic analysis and focusing on interconnections and evolution
over time.128
As a result of this new focus, an increasing number of jurisdictions have
implemented new institutional frameworks to support macroprudential
policy, including the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) in the
United States and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) in the EU.
126 See, e.g., THE BD. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, CYBER SECURITY IN SECURITIES
MARKETS – AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (2016).
127 See Sarah Dahlgren, The Importance of Addressing Cybersecurity Risks in the Financial Sector,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK (March 24, 2015), https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/
speeches/2015/dah150324.
128 See IMF ET AL., ELEMENTS OF EFFECTIVE MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY (2016).
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These new institutional frameworks have been tasked, along with the IMF,
FSB, and BIS, to seek to develop and implement macroprudential policies to
prevent financial crises and support financial stability. Macroprudential
policy thus seeks to use the massive amounts of data being reported to
regulators in order to identify patterns and reduce the severity of the financial
cycle.
This process however is proving challenging. Nonetheless, some
progress is being made in identifying potential leading indicators for future
financial instability.129 The progress to date involves quantitative analysis of
large volumes of data searching for interconnections and implications. The
massive amounts of data being reported by financial institutions and financial
infrastructure providers around the world is providing an ever increasing
volume of data of ever-increasing forms which can feed into these analytical
processes. Already, major central banks such as the Federal Reserve, the
European Central Bank and the Bank of England are beginning to use data
“heat maps” to highlight potential issues arising from automated analyses of
the masses of daily and other data (such as stress tests) being produced by
the financial services industry.130
While these efforts remain at an early stage, they do highlight the likely
future direction of RegTech in the area of macroprudential policy. At the
same time, as a result of the process of analysis, regulators are continually
identifying needs for yet more data.131 This results in ever increasing
reporting requirements for financial institutions, further driving the need for
RegTech processes and the necessity of centralized support services to
collect and produce the required data at the required frequency and in the
required format. In particular, the Basel Committee (in the so-called BCBS
239) has set requirements for risk data aggregation and reporting which, as
they are implemented around the world, are driving internal processes in both
financial institutions and regulators, with an increasing focus on near realtime delivery, with near real-time analysis hoped to follow.132 Significantly,
the FSB and IMF have identified the need for harmonization of reporting
templates for systemically important financial institutions in order to make
analysis of data collected more straightforward.133
While these are very important developments and show the first steps
129 Id.; see COMM’ ON THE GLOB. FIN. SYS., EXPERIENCES WITH THE EX ANTE APPRAISAL OF MACROPRUDENTIAL INSTRUMENTS (2016); BLAISE GADANECZ & KAUSHIK JAYARAM, MACROPRUDENTIAL
POLICY FRAMEWORKS, INSTRUMENTS AND INDICATORS: A REVIEW (2015).
130 See IMF ET AL., supra note 128.
131 See FIN. STABILITY BD. & IMF, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND INFORMATION GAPS: SECOND PHASE
OF THE G-20 DATA GAPS INITIATIVE (DGI-2) – FIRST PROGRESS REPORT (2016).
132 BASEL COMM., PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE RISK DATA AGGREGATION AND RISK REPORTING
(2013). With thanks to Kevin Nixon of KPMG and formerly of the Institute of International Finance for
this point.
133 Id.
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on the way to better regulation through technology, they highlight the
challenges for other regulators in terms of expertise, access to technology,
and financial constraints. They also set the stage for the application of more
sophisticated big data tools including deep learning and AI.
V. FINTECH REQUIRES REGTECH
Building on the framework of analysis introduced in Part II establishing
a working definition of RegTech, Parts III and IV have shown that regulators
relied on the market penetration of technology to promote the development
of DFS in developing countries and worked with industry participants to
support development of financial infrastructure and related regulatory tools.
More recently, policy makers and regulators are focusing attention on areas
such as cybersecurity and macroprudential policy, highlighting the potential
for far greater progress in coming years.
A. Re-inventing Financial Regulation
Based on the preceding analysis, the focus of RegTech going forward
needs to shift away from the efficiency gains it has provided to date and look
instead to RegTech’s potential as a transformative tool to revolutionize
financial regulation. Indeed, the speed of FinTech innovation, combined with
the dramatic progress witnessed in some developing countries, warrants not
only that RegTech be used to make financial regulation more effective and
affordable, but also that RegTech be used to reconceptualize and redesign
financial regulation in line with the transformation of financial market
infrastructure.134
As FinTech gradually moves from digitization of money to embrace the
monetization of data, the regulatory framework for finance will need to be
rethought so as to cover notions previously unnecessary such as data
sovereignty and algorithm supervision. At this stage, the sustainable
development of FinTech will need to be built around a new framework,
namely RegTech. Doing so will required a sequenced approach.
First there is the need for a holistic approach that focuses on building
twenty-first century infrastructure to support market functions. This is most
clear in the context of SWIFT, with efforts now focusing on developing an
improved structure to support global payments. On the technological side,
blockchain may offer the potential to replace the clearing and settlement
methods devised in the nineteenth century.135 In the context of emerging
markets, India’s recent introduction of a multilevel strategy to support
FinTech evolution and innovation broadly shows one very promising
134
135
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example of how RegTech 3.0 could look.
Second is the challenge of developing appropriate regulatory responses
to FinTech innovation. This is a core aspect of RegTech 3.0 that has been a
major challenge for regulators around the world to date and that we have
discussed previously.136 One group of participants (often from the tech side)
have argued for a laissez-faire approach, so as first to allow FinTech to grow
and then, only once it has developed, to put in place regulation.137 In many
ways, this was China’s approach until 2015. Because of a number of negative
experiences, since the middle of 2015, China has instead focused on
implementing a complete regulatory framework for FinTech.138 The
traditional financial services industry, arguably fearful of competition from
new entrants unhindered by complex and expensive regulatory and
compliance requirements, typically argues in favor of similar treatment for
all.
In our view, the key is to balance risk and potential innovation by
working closely to understand industry developments but at the same time
making sure that similar activities are regulated in similar ways in order to
protect against regulatory arbitrage.139 Regulatory arbitrage, in particular
moving activities to unregulated environments to avoid regulatory scrutiny,
together with excessive reliance on financial institutions’ internal
quantitative risk management systems, were two of the major underlying
factors in the 2008 GFC.140 This idea of regulatory arbitrage underlies the
postcrisis focus on addressing risks of shadow banking.
At the same time, there should be a multilevel approach which applies
graduated regulatory requirements to firms based upon their level of risk and
size. FinTech experience in the past decade (particularly in Africa and China)
highlights the challenge of speed of development and the potential to move
from “too small to care” to “too big to fail” (systemically important) in very
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Arner, Barberis & Buckley, supra note 2; Zhou, Arner & Buckley, supra note 49.
See, e.g., FinTech Regulation in China, Hong Kong, and Singapore, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT
(May
10,
2016),
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/139380/fintechregulation-in-china-hong-kong-and-singapore; Deborah Ralston, Let’s Not Regulate Away the
Competition Fintech Can Bring, THE CONVERSATION (Aug. 6, 2015), https://theconversation.com/letsnot-regulate-away-the-competition-fintech-can-bring-45496.
138 Andrew Meola, China Just Hinted It Could Increase Fintech Regulation, BUSINESS INSIDER (June
29, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/china-just-hinted-it-could-increase-fintech-regulation-20166/?r=AU&IR=T.
139 The G-20 in its recently approved High-Level Principles for Digital Financial Inclusion also calls
for the promotion of an “Enabling and Proportionate Legal and Regulatory Framework” that “ensure[s]
that similar risks are regulated in a similar manner and that an appropriate risk-based approach to
supervision is developed.” GLOB. P’SHIP FOR FIN. INCLUSION, G20 HIGH-LEVEL PRINCIPLES FOR DIGITAL
FINANCIAL INCLUSION (2016).
140 See also U.S. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT - FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN
THE UNITED STATES (2011).
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short periods of time.141 In fact, it is this that has caused the reevaluation of
regulatory approaches in China.142 This also highlights the necessity of
monitoring of new developments across the financial system by regulators,
in order to both understand what is happening and its potential implications.
At the international level, this is now taking place through the FSB in
conjunction with the IMF and BIS, in an effort to identify and raise awareness
of new developments that may quickly arise in other markets.143
Third, we will consider regulatory sandboxes. These have been a central
focus in the context of appropriate regulation of FinTech. From our
perspective, perhaps the greatest potential for the sandbox tool is in the
context of the evolution of RegTech, through the opportunity they present for
the testing of new approaches by industry and regulators.
B. From KYC to KYD: Changing Regulation Byte by Byte
From a technological standpoint, the development of RegTech is not a
major challenge.144 The primary limitation may instead come from the
regulators’ own ability to handle and process the increased amount of data
generated through technology.145 The UK FCA seems cognizant of this fact
as it is currently controlling access to its regulatory sandbox to a limited
number of applicants with a detailed testing plan.146 As a result, there needs
to be a coordinated approach by financial regulators to support the
development of RegTech. Harmonization of financial markets and
regulations has a long history, and harmonization seems increasingly
important given the mobility of new FinTech start-ups. Furthermore, in the
context of the UK, lack of harmonization within the EU prevents the
complete development of regulatory sandboxes.147
In the UK, the Blackett report has proposed a methodology to favor
harmonization of data-driven regulation and compliance models, which
would entail:148
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Arner, Barberis & Buckley, supra note 2.
Zhou, Arner & Buckley, supra note 49.
143 See Huw Jones, Global Regulators Move Closer to Regulating Fintech, REUTERS (March 31,
2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-g20-regulations-fintech-idUSKCN0WX21J.
144 See UK GOVERNMENT CHIEF SCIENTIFIC ADVISER, supra note 119, at 53.
145 Id. at 48.
146 This includes: test durations, key milestones, risk analysis, investigation of potential exposure,
measurement metrics and exit strategy. For more details, refer to Andrew Moyle & Fiona Maclean, WorldFirst Regulatory Sandbox Open for Play in the UK, LATHAM & WATKINS 1 (May 2016),
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/LW-world-first-regulatory-sandbox-open-for-play-in-UK.
147 There is even a current discussion on developing an EU-wide regulatory sandbox. See William
Shaw, EU Weighs Cross-Border Financial Regulatory Sandbox, LAW360 (Sept. 16, 2016),
http://www.law360.com/articles/840834/eu-weighs-cross-border-financial-regulatory-sandbox.
148 See UK GOVERNMENT CHIEF SCIENTIFIC ADVISER, supra note 119, at 49.
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• Regulatory policy modelling: emerging techniques such as agentbased modelling could be used to simulate the likely impact of new
policies before enactment and the practical impact of existing
regulation, including conflicts between regulators. Economic analysis
of the impact of regulation has been an important trend since the Reagan
administration in the United States and has increasingly been adopted
by other jurisdictions, including the EU as well as at the international
level through quantitative impact studies from the FSB, BIS, and Basel
Committee. The result has been the necessity of the creation of
economic analysis capabilities in regulatory agencies in order to
produce the required reports. The U.S. SEC’s Department of Economic
Risk Analysis is one such example.
• Reporting standards: developing common compliance tagging and
reporting standards across multiple jurisdictions could support calls for
the mandatory sharing of information between regulators with
overlapping jurisdictions. This is being discussed in the context of the
G-20, FSB, and IMF Data Gaps Initiative in particular and would have
the potential to reduce reporting challenges for major financial
institutions and potentially provide better data to support
macroprudential analysis.
• Systemic risk tools: encouraging the academic community to develop
a range of mathematical techniques to assess risk has the potential to
yield important tools for regulators. This process is at early stages, with
increasing cooperation between major central banks and academics, but
has much greater potential for development going forward.
• Harmonization: the integration of national, European, and global
financial monitoring systems could be beneficial. Institutions are faced
with varied regulatory demands across jurisdictions. Standardized and
harmonized reporting could therefore be beneficial for both institutions
and regulators. As highlighted above, this has now been proposed and
supported by the FSB, IMF, and G-20 as part of the G-20 Data Gaps
Initiative. Likewise, efforts are progressing in the context of OTC
derivatives reporting and information sharing. The real challenge
however remains in its implementation.
• Uniform compliance tools: because compliance is becoming
increasingly analytical, the regulators might encourage the development
of a suite of open source compliance tools (which in turn would provide
an opportunity for FinTech and other financial services start-ups).
• Collaborations and selected data sharing: could be encouraged
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between different international regulators, for example with respect to
bad actors within the system. For instance, it would benefit UK
regulators to know which UK banks are being investigated for bad
practices in other markets. Another example where there is truly
transformative potential is in the area of money laundering and KYC
requirements. A global system of reporting and KYC available to
participants (both regulators and industry) could transform AML efforts
and related compliance costs as well as support financial inclusion, as
highlighted in the ongoing G-20 and FSB focus on correspondent
banking.
• Regulators collaborate with FinTech: to see what kinds of data are
being collected and new ways of collecting data, e.g. logging location
data alongside transaction data. Central banks in major jurisdictions in
particular have the necessary resources to drive these sorts of
collaborations, as do international financial institutions such as the
World Bank and Asian Development Bank in the context of providing
resources, financial and technical, to developing countries, which will
face ever increasing challenges to their regulatory and technological
capabilities as FinTech continues to transform finance.
This provides a framework of steps on an important path that regulators
are now beginning to follow.
C. Building Twenty-First Century Financial Infrastructure
Looking forward, two examples highlight the sorts of RegTech 3.0
initiatives which may provide the potential to transform finance.
This first is the example of blockchain (distributed ledger and related
technologies) and its use in clearing and settlement (as well as many other
areas).149 Amongst the most advanced discussions of blockchain is a
discussion of its potential use in clearing and settlement of securities trades
in exchange-traded and related environments (such as dark pools and
ECNs).150 The Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) and NASDAQ-OMX
are both engaged in blockchain projects, of which NASDAQ’s is more
149 The G-20 High-Level Principles for Digital Financial Inclusion also encourage worldwide
regulators to “[c]ollaborate with industry to explore the potential of distributed ledger technology
[blockchain] to improve the transparency, efficiency, security, and reach of wholesale and retail financial
infrastructure, allowing for appropriate risk mitigation and safeguards.” GPFI, G20 HIGH-LEVEL
PRINCIPLES FOR DIGITAL FINANCIAL INCLUSION (2016).
150 Goldman Sachs recently reported that the cash equities market could save US$6 billion if
blockchain technology were used. See Blockchain Tech Could Save Cash Equities Market $6bn a Year –
Goldman Sachs, FINEXTRA (May 26, 2016), https://www.finextra.com/newsarticle/28955/blockchaintech-could-save-cash-equities-market-6bn-a-year—-goldman-sachs.

406

DOC2 (DO NOT DELETE)

9/18/17 1:12 PM

FinTech and RegTech
37:371 (2017)

advanced.151 In addition, major financial institutions are progressing with
development of blockchain-based systems for clearing and settlement of
foreign exchange transactions, potentially the next level of evolution of the
long development of regulator and industry efforts to support the efficiency
and stability of these largest and most global of markets. Finally, efforts are
underway to develop blockchain systems to address requirements for OTC
derivatives clearing and settlement, implemented in the wake of the 2008
crisis.152 Blockchain may also underpin efforts to redevelop SWIFT and
similar systems.
Overall, each of these initiatives requires close collaboration between
industry and regulators in order to be successful and each has the potential to
greatly improve the functioning of markets and massively reduce costs.
A second example involves the so-called India Stack. India Stack is an
idea originated by a group of Indian IT entrepreneurs and supported by the
government and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) that involves four main
levels.153 Together, the four levels are intended to provide the basis for a
FinTech transformation of India’s inefficient financial sector and broaden
access to financial services across India’s massive population, while at the
same time opening the market to competition from entrepreneurs, start-ups
and IT and ecommerce firms.
At the first level is a national system of biometric identification.154
Identity is at the base of most financial sector access issues and is a challenge
across all participants in finance. In India, addressing this has involved the
creation of biometric national identification cards based on ten fingerprints
and two retina scans. Such IDs have been issued to over one billion people
since 2010.155
At the second level is the establishment of bank accounts as part of the
process of delivering national services such as pension, health and other
welfare payments and transfers.156 To date, over 200 million bank accounts
151 See James Eyers, ASX Builds Blockchain for Australian Equities, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Jan.
22, 2016), http://www.smh.com.au/business/banking-and-finance/asx-builds-blockchain-for-australianequities-20160121-gmbic0.html; Michael del Castillo, Nasdaq Opens Blockchain Services to Global
Exchange Partners, COINDESK (May 26, 2016), http://www.coindesk.com/nasdaqs-blockchain-servicesglobal-exchange/.
152 See Blockchain Technology Will Profoundly Change the Derivatives Industry, BITCOIN MAGAZINE
(May 27, 2016), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/blockchain-technology-will-profoundly-changethe-derivatives-industry-1464368431.
153 Abhijit Bose, India’s Fintech Revolution is Primed to Put Banks out of Business, TECHCRUNCH
(June 14, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/06/14/indias-fintech-revolution-is-primed-to-put-banksout-of-business/. To learn more about India Stack, visit its official website at http://www.indiastack.org/
About-India-Stack.
154 Id.
155 Press Release, Unique Identification Authority of India, Indian National Identity Program Tops 1
Billion Enrolees (May 2, 2016), http://www.irisid.com/indian-national-identity-program-tops-onebillion-enrollees/.
156 Bose, supra note 153.
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have been opened as part of this process, dramatically expanding access to
the formal financial system.157
At the third level is a common payment API to enable payments to be
made by anyone through a common system supported by the RBI.158
The fourth level involves a series of electronic KYC initiatives which
allow individuals to maintain details of their financial affairs and to provide
these details to financial services and other providers in order to meet KYC
requirements.159 These E-KYC utility platforms show how RegTech can
improve integrity of financial markets and reduce counterparty risks.
The combination of these initiatives has arguably set the stage for a
dramatic transformation of the Indian financial system, similar in scope and
scale to that which has taken place in China but with a potentially very
different resulting character. Looking forward, the development of new
approaches in an environment conducive to testing and experimentation will
be essential.160 This too is emerging, in the form of regulatory sandboxes.
D. Regulatory Sandboxes: A Testing Environment for RegTech 3.0
Regulatory sandboxes represent a major element of new regulatory
approaches. The principles of regulatory sandboxes can originally be found
within the technology sector where a sandbox represents a virtual
environment to test in isolation a new process or software. However, in the
financial markets context, a better parallel may be with clinical trials, as the
sector is similarly regulated to prevent consumer harm while testing new
innovation.
This leading example to date comes from the UK. Announced by the
UK FCA’s Project Innovate Unit, a “regulatory sandbox” is expected to be a
“safe space in which businesses can test innovative products, services,
business models and delivery mechanisms without immediately incurring all
the normal regulatory consequences on engaging in the activity of
question.”161 The UK has recently commenced its sandbox and there are
already other jurisdictions (including Australia162, Singapore163,

157

Id.
Id.
159 Id.
160 See CHRIS BRUMMER & DANIEL GORFINE, FINTECH: BUILDING A 21ST-CENTURY REGULATOR’S
TOOLKIT, 6–11 (Oct. 2014).
161 FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, REGULATORY SANDBOX 4 (Nov. 2015).
162 Moyle & Maclean, supra note 146.
163 See Media Release, Monetary Authority of Singapore, MAS Proposes a ‘Regulatory Sandbox’ for
FinTech Experiments (June 2016), http://www.mas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Media-Releases/
2016/MAS-Proposes-a-Regulatory-Sandbox-for-FinTech-Experiments.aspx.
158
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Switzerland164, Hong Kong165, Thailand166, Abu Dhabi167 and Malaysia168)
that have expressed their intention to set up similar initiatives.
The FCA has established a framework of application as well as
safeguards for the operation of its sandbox. The stated market objectives for
the sandbox are to: (1) reduce time-to-market at a potentially lower cost; (2)
provide better access to finance; and (3) foster more innovative products
reaching the market.169
The FCA has been exploring a series of options in terms of sandbox
innovation. These include: (1) Virtual Sandbox, (2) Regulatory Sandbox, and
(3) Sandbox Umbrella. The access to the sandbox is limited both in the scope
of applicants and duration. Indeed, as it currently stands, the sandbox will be
opened in phases,170 and be reserved to participants which are able to
demonstrate:
• That the Firm falls within the right scope: such that the planned
new solution is designed to support the financial services industry.
• Genuine Innovation: such that the new solution is novel or
significantly different to existing offerings.
• Consumer Benefit: such that the innovation offers a good prospect
of identifiable benefit to consumers.171
• Need for Sandbox: such that the business in fact has a genuine need
for testing within a sandbox framework.
• Background Research: such that the business has invested
appropriate resources in developing the new solution, understanding the
applicable regulations and mitigating the risks.
From a start-up perspective, regulatory sandbox access represents an
opportunity to operate without complete licensing obligations. To do so, the
164 See Press Release, FINMA, FINMA Reduces Obstacles to FinTech (Mar. 17, 2016),
https://www.finma.ch/en/news/2016/03/20160317-mm-fintech/.
165 See Hong Kong Regulator to Launch Fintech ‘Sandbox’, THOMSON REUTERS (Sept. 5, 2016),
http://www.reuters.com/article/hongkong-banks-regulator-idUSH9N18001M.
166 See Forming a Fintech Family, BANGKOK POST, (Sept. 14, 2016), http://www.bangkokpost.com/
business/news/1085544/forming-a-fintech-family.
167 See Press Release, Abu Dhabi Global Market, Abu Dhabi Global Market Sets Out Proposal for
Fintech Regulatory Framework in the UAE, Abu Dhabi Global Market (May 10, 2016).
168 See BANK NEGARA MALAYSIA, REGULATORY SANDBOX: DISCUSSION PAPER (July 29, 2016).
169 FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, supra note 161, at 5.
170 The first cohort can apply to enter the sandbox between May 9, 2016 and July 8, 2016, and the
second cohort is due to start in January 2017.
171 This criterion is due to be continuously met during the participation in the sandbox.
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FCA will propose a number of options such as:172
• No enforcement action letter (NAL): Stating that the FCA will not
take enforcement actions against the testing activities where it is agreed
that the firm does not breach the requirements or objectives of the FCA.
• Individual Guidance Letter: Provided that the firm’s actions are
within the guidance issued by the FCA, no enforcement actions will be
taken against them.
• Waivers: “Where it is clear that testing activities do not meet our
rules but the firm can meet the waiver test and the rules are within the
FCA’s power to waive, the FCA can waive or modify particular rules
for sandbox firms.”173
However, the sandbox needs to uphold the regulators’ mandates and
particularly that of consumer protection. As a result, the FCA has made it
clear that in the event that consumers (as opposed to anonymized data) are
engaged in activities conducted within the sandbox, four different approaches
are available to be adopted:174
• Approach 1: As in clinical trials, sandbox firms can only test their
new solutions on customers who have given fully informed consent to
be included in testing. Customers have to be notified of potential risks
and the available compensation.
• Approach 2: FCA agrees on a case-by-case basis the disclosure,
protection and compensation approach for the testing activity.
• Approach 3: Customers should have the same rights as customers
who engage with other authorised firms (e.g. to complain to the firm
and then to the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS), and have access
to the financial services compensation scheme).
• Approach 4: Businesses undertaking sandbox trials are required to
compensate any losses (including investment losses) to customers and
must demonstrate that they have the resources (capital) to do that.
Furthermore, the FCA has also made clear that its ability to allow a firm
to operate without the traditional licensing regime is subject to EU law
172

FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, supra note 161, at 9.
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limitations.175
Looking forward, such regulatory sandboxes are likely to be one of the
best ways to support the future development of RegTech 3.0.
VI. RECONCEPTUALIZING FINANCIAL REGULATION
Whilst RegTech 2.0 is largely about streamlining and automating
regulatory compliance and reporting, it is adapted to rules developed to suit
a much different technological context than that which is evolving rapidly
today. Going forward, RegTech 3.0 should be built in a forward-looking
manner. Regulation is a product of its own history, and market context,
current technological developments (such as blockchain) and emerging
market developments (i.e. India Stack) are so fundamentally challenging the
status quo that reconceptualization of regulation becomes necessary.
Part V set a potential conceptual framework for RegTech 3.0. It appears
there is a progressive alignment underway in how FinTech and RegTech are
evolving, both sharing data-centricity as a common denominator. This
represents a paradigm shift from a KYC approach towards a KYD (KnowYour-Data) paradigm, which, while profound, remains a few years away.
Until then, the design and implementation of proportionate and data-driven
regulation should enable proactive regulators to handle innovation without
compromising their mandate.
As one example, the UK government is seeking to promote the design
of a regulatory framework able to dynamically adapt to new rules and
regulations.176 The argument for cost reduction within compliance is very
strong, and RegTech looks particularly beneficial for firms and regulators
alike. Indeed, RegTech should enable firms to better control risks and costs,
and regulators to benefit from more efficient monitoring tools and from
simulation systems to evaluate the consequences of future legislative
reforms.
Yet, balance is needed in assessing what is currently feasible when it
comes to fully automating regulatory and compliance systems.177
Furthermore, the RegTech sector will continue to reinvent itself. While post2008 regulatory requirements are still evolving, going forward we can expect
the next financial crisis to add extra layers of requirements and companies
that develop new business models, in turn generating unexpected risks. The
legal academic literature would strongly benefit from engaging with what is
currently being developed within data science and deep learning, in
particular.
175

Id. at 8.
See UK GOVERNMENT CHIEF SCIENTIFIC ADVISER, supra note 119, at 47.
177 VYTAUTAS CYRAS & REINHARD RIEDL, FORMULATING THE ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE
COMPLIANCE PROBLEM (2009).
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The principles behind regulatory sandboxes can be unbundled and
enhanced by introducing the concepts of Minimum Regulatory Obligations
(MRO), while Recovery and Resolution Plans (RRPs) should be adapted to
fit start-ups.178 The combination of these two models may resolve current
deficiencies, moving the sandbox exercise away from its current pilot status
to a system-wide framework able to nurture innovation in financial markets
without distorting competition.
In this context, the emergence of the UK FCA’s Project Innovate
provides a useful example. The Project Innovate team was built on the back
of the new banking landscape which aims to introduce competition and new
banks in the UK.179 This was only made possible by having proportionate
regulatory capital demanded from new entrants, as well as the design of a
resolution and recovery plan (RRP). In this way, the RRP concept combined
with the MRO concept provides a basis for an appropriate way forward in
the context of regulating new entrants.
Regulation and regulators may usefully extend the reasoning of RRPs
to start-ups by contemplating their failure. One example is the introduction
of a deposit insurance scheme in China, to provide a safety net allowing for
the potential failure of new banks.180 In other words, market entry for new
participants could be facilitated for those that have a clear exit strategy in
case of failure due to internal or external factors.
In conclusion, this paper illustrates that for the past 50 years the
application of technology within regulation has changed dramatically. The
authors have defined the pre-2008 evolution as RegTech 1.0, a paradigm
severely damaged by the 2008 GFC. Since 2008, the combination of new
regulatory obligations and technology in the financial industry forms the first
element of a new RegTech 2.0; the use of technology to facilitate and
streamline compliance. The second element of RegTech 2.0, involving
regulators using technology to improve their supervision and regulation, is
emerging but still at an early stage.
Looking forward, the truly transformative potential of RegTech is for it
to be used to re-conceptualize the future of financial regulation by leveraging
on new technology, and we are beginning to see certain elements of this new
RegTech 3.0 emerge, with technological progress changing both market
178 This similarly requires a regulatory mindset shift, as we move from a too-big-to-fail paradigm,
whereby risk and contagion are sought to be mitigated, to a “small-enough-to-fail” paradigm whereby
failure is anticipated and planned for from the start. Start-ups are particularly suited for the development
of RRPs since over 90% of them will fail and their size makes the mapping of their risk (e.g. liquidity,
market, reputation, technology, etc.) relatively easy given their simpler technological and corporate
structures.
179 Project Innovate and Innovation Hub, UK FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY (May 11, 2015),
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/project-innovate-innovation-hub.
180 Lingling Wei, China to Begin Deposit Insurance in May, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 31, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-to-begin-deposit-insurance-from-may-1427794649.
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participants and infrastructure, with data as the common denominator. The
practical consequences of this shift would mean undergoing a transformation
from a KYC mindset to a KYD approach. The opportunity is to move from
travelling in an A380 to the Starship Enterprise. The A380 is a splendid
aircraft, smooth, quiet, capacious and powerful. However, the A380 is only
an incremental improvement in aeronautical design. The quantum
improvement is the Starship Enterprise.
This is where the FinTech revolution is taking us. As our financial
system moves beyond KYC to KYD we will move into an entirely new
regulatory paradigm that will have to deal with everything from digital
identity to data sovereignty and that will have the potential to extend far
beyond the financial sphere.181
For regulators, this implies that data security and use will be more
important than ever before for consumer protection, prudential regulation
will focus on algorithm compliance, and financial stability will also be
concerned with financial and information networks. The shift from RegTech
2.0 to RegTech 3.0 represents a market-wide reform which will need to be
sequenced. The emergence of FinTech companies, combined with the wider
use of regulatory sandboxes, offers a unique opportunity to pilot this novel
kind of regulatory architecture that is proportionate, efficient and data-driven
before market-wide implementation. FinTech requires RegTech. The
challenge for regulators globally will be “to boldly go where no man has gone
before” to conceptualize and implement the possibilities of RegTech.

181 See, e.g., WEF, A BLUEPRINT FOR DIGITAL IDENTITY - THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN
BUILDING DIGITAL IDENTITY (Aug. 2016).
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